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We study evolutionary models of financial markets. In particular, we study an
evolutionary market model with short-lived assets and an evolutionary model with
long-lived assets. In the long-lived asset market, investors are allowed to use
general dynamic investment strategies. We find sufficient conditions for the Kelly
portfolio rule to dominate the market exponentially fast. Moreover, when investors
use simple strategies but have incorrect beliefs, we show that the strategy which is
“closer”to the Kelly rule cannot be driven out of the market. This means that this
strategy will either dominate or at least survive, i.e., the relative market share
does not converge to zero. In the market with short-lived assets, we study the
dynamics when the states of the world are not identically distributed. This marks
the first attempt to study the dynamics of the market when the probability of
success changes according to the relative shares of investors. In this problem, we
first study a skew product of the random dynamical system associates with the
market dynamics. In particular, we compute the Lyapunov exponents of the skew
product. This enables us to produce a “surviving”investment strategy, i.e., the
investor who follows this rule will dominate the market or at least survive. All the
mathematical tools in the thesis lie within the framework of random dynamical
systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The theory of evolution has a long history in biological, physical and social sci-
ences. In financial markets, evolutionary finance examines the dynamic interaction
of investment strategies and their long-run performance. Evolutionary finance has
been a very active area of research in financial mathematics for the past twenty
years. Survival and extinction questions of investment strategies have been exam-
ined in Blume and Easley [15]. They generalised the pioneering work of Kelly [29].
Kelly showed that the investor who follows the principle of betting your beliefs
ultimately accumulates total market wealth when the market composed only of
Arrow securities. This principle prescribes dividing wealth amongst assets accord-
ing to the probability of their success. The work of Kelly was inspired by ideas of
his postdoctoral mentor Claude Shannon, the creator of information theory [19].
Afterwards, the work of Kelly was developed by Breiman [16] and Cover et. al.
[1, 12, 13]. In all these papers, the authors assumed that the asset prices were
exogenous.
At the beginning of this century, there has been a remarkable development in evolu-
tionary ideas in finance. This development has been mainly carried by Evstigneev,
Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ [27]. Evstigneev et. al. [21] analysed an evolutionary mar-
ket model with short-lived assets. In [21], the investors use constant investment
strategies and the prices are endogenous in the model. It is proved that there is a
unique survival investment strategy which accumulates the market wealth. After
this paper, this evolutionary model was studied under different assumptions and
from different points of view in [2, 26]. In the first paper, Amir et. al [2] used the
1
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homogenous discrete-time Markov process states of the world and general invest-
ment strategies were employed by the investors. In the last two papers, they used
the ideas from the theory of random dynamical systems [5, 14]. In [10], we have
examined the evolutionary market model with short-lived assets. However, we al-
lowed the states of the world to be not identically distributed. They may depend
on the amount of money invested in the assets. We have computed the Lyapunov
exponents of the skew product associated with random market system and have
applied these ideas to study wealth dynamics of investors. We have identified a
portfolio rule similar to Kelly rule. We have shown, [10], that the investor who
follows this rule cannot be driven out of the market. Our results in [10] marks
the first attempt to study the market dynamics when the probability of success is
allowed to change according to the relative shares of investors.
In [22, 23] Evstigneev et. al. introduced a model with long-lived asset. It is shown
that the Kelly rule is evolutionary stable and it is single survivor in the mar-
ket. Moreover, it is demonstrated in [7] that the Kelly rule forms a unique Nash
equilibrium strategy. In the last three papers [7, 22, 23], the investors use simple
portfolio rules. Also it is assumed that at least one of the investors uses the Kelly
portfolio rule. Recently we have shown [11] that when all the investors do not have
full information about the probability distribution of the assets and consequently
none of them uses the exact Kelly rule, then the investor who is closer to the Kelly
rule may dominate the market or at least survive. Our work in [11] also marks
the first attempt to study the market model with long-lived assets where none of
the investors have correct information about probability distribution of the states
of the world.
Amir et. al. [3] analysed the evolutionary model with long-lived assets when in-
vestors use general, adaptive portfolio rules. The authors showed that the Kelly
rule always survives. Their work suggested a very interesting question: Under
what conditions does the Kelly rule dominate the market? In [9], we found suffi-
cient conditions for the Kelly portfolio rule to dominate the market exponentially
fast. Roughly speaking, we show that if the Kelly rule and the “market portfo-
lio”deviate, then the Kelly rule will dominate the market.
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The mathematical framework of all these models is given by random dynamical
systems. Random dynamical systems appear in modelling of many phenomena
in economics, biology, climatology, etc., when uncertainties or random influences
are taken into consideration. These uncertainties or random influences are called
noises. This mathematical framework was mainly developed by L. Arnold [5].
Random dynamical systems explain probabilistically how the dynamics is effected
by noise. When the dynamical system is generated by a differential equation,
then it is called continuous-time dynamical system. When the dynamical sys-
tem is generated by a difference equation or a map, then it is called discrete-time
dynamical system. In this thesis we will be concerned with the latter; i.e., discrete-
time random dynamical systems. The concept of a random dynamical system is
an extension of the deterministic concept of a dynamical system and it gets to-
gether the ideas and methods from the well developed areas of dynamical systems
and probability theory. When applying results from dynamical systems to real
life problems external noise is unavoidable. Therefore, it is essential to require
the exact mathematical model to allow some small errors along orbits. This is
archived in the framework of a random dynamical system: we allow to embed the
randomness within the model to deal with this unavoidable uncertainty about the
observed initial states and correct parameter values.
There are recent developments of random dynamical systems theory in economics.
According to [33], the theory and application of random dynamical systems is at a
cutting edge in both mathematics and economics. In K.R. Schenk-Hoppe´ [33], he
studied and demonstrated the role and importance of dynamical systems theory
in economics. Furthermore, he demonstrated that the theory of random dynam-
ical systems for economic modelling and analysis is very useful with stochastic
components. The work in [33] focused on stochastic dynamic models in economic
growth. In particular, it was emphasised that random dynamical systems allows
to examine stability properties of economic systems, random interactions and time
dependent environments.
In Chapter 2 we give basic definitions and results from probability theory, stochas-
tic processes and ergodic theory. Moreover we state definitions and results from
finance and economics that we use in this thesis. In Chapter 3, we analyse ran-
dom maps with constant and position dependent probabilities. In particular we
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provide formulae of Lyapunov exponents for certain position dependent random
maps. This is part of our paper [10]. In Chapter 4, we introduce the evolutionary
market model with short-lived assets. We first give a literature review for models
with dynamic and constant investment strategies. Moreover, this chapter includes
our result from [10] which provides a surviving portfolio criterion when the states
of the world depend on the amount of money invested in the assets. In Chapter
5, the evolutionary market with long-lived assets is introduced. We first review
notions and literature in evolutionary finance for models with long-lived assets.
Section 5.3 includes our result from [9], where we have provided sufficient condi-
tions for the Kelly portfolio rule to dominate the market exponentially fast. In
Chapter 5 we also present our result from [11]. We have proved that when all the
investors have partial or no information about the probability distribution of the
assets, then the investor who is closer to the Kelly rule either dominates or at
least survives. Namely, the relative market share of the investor does not converge
to zero a.s. In Chapter 6, we conclude. In Appendix A we have proved auxiliary
lemmas for the proof of the main results in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Probability Theory
In this section we state basic definitions and results from probability theory. All
these statements are need in this thesis. We have mostly used references [17,
18, 20, 34]. For more information on probability theory we refer the reader to
[17, 18, 20, 34].
2.1.1 Probability Spaces
Definition 2.1.
Let Ω be a non-empty set. A σ-field F on Ω is a family of subsets of Ω such that
i) Ω ∈ F ;
ii) If A ∈ F , then Ac ∈ F ;
iii) If A1, A2, . . . is a sequence of sets in F , then ∪∞i=1Ai ∈ F .
The elements of F are called F -measurable sets. The pair (Ω,F) is called a
measurable space.
Example 2.2.
• F1 = {∅,Ω} is the smallest σ-field.
5
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• F2 = P (Ω) = {A : A ⊆ Ω} is the largest σ-field of subsets of Ω.
• Let Ω = {0, 2, 4, 6, 8} and F3 = {∅,Ω, {2, 4}, {0, 6, 8}}. F3 is a σ-field.
Indeed,
i) Ω ∈ F3,
ii) ∅c = Ω ∈ F3, Ωc = ∅ ∈ F3,
{2, 4}c = {0, 6, 8} ∈ F3, {0, 6, 8}c = {2, 4} ∈ F3,
iii) ∅ ∪ {2, 4} = {2, 4} ∈ F3, ∅ ∪ {0, 6, 8} = {0, 6, 8} ∈ F3, ∅ ∪Ω = Ω ∈ F3,
{0, 6, 8}∪{2, 4} = Ω ∈ F3, Ω∪{2, 4} = Ω ∈ F3, Ω∪{0, 6, 8} = Ω ∈ F3.
An important definition in measure theory is given as follows.
Definition 2.3.
The Borel field on R, B (R), is the σ-field generated by open intervals in R. Subsets
of R which belong to B (R) are called Borel sets.
Example 2.4.
For a topological space X, the Borel algebra on X is the smallest σ-algebra con-
taining all open or closed sets.
Definition 2.5.
If f : A→ B and C ⊂ B, we let
f−1 (C) = {r ∈ A : f (r) ∈ C}
and call f−1 (C) the inverse image of C by f . Hence, f−1 (C) contains all points
in the domains of f mapped by f into C.
Proposition 2.6.
Let X : Ω → R denote a real-valued function. The collection of sets X−1 (B),
where B ranges over the Borel subsets of R, is a σ-field on Ω. We denote this
σ-field by FX and call it the σ-field generated by X.
Definition 2.7.
A mapping f : Ω→ R, where (Ω,F) is a measurable space, is called F -measurable
if f−1 (B) ∈ F for every Borel subset B ⊂ R.
Example 2.8.
Let f : R→ R. The function f defined by f (r) = r is measurable. Indeed,
f−1 ((a, b)) = {r ∈ R : a < f (r) < b} = (a, b) .
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Since (a, b) is interval, thus it is measurable. Therefore, f−1 ((a, b)) is measurable.
So that f is measurable.
The properties of measurable functions are given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.9 (Properties of Measurable Functions).
1) If f, g : Ω→ R are measurable functions, then f + g, f − g, fg and f
g
(g 6= 0)
are measurable.
2) If f : Ω→ R is a measurable function, then f 2 is a measurable function.
3) If f, g : Ω→ R are measurable functions and α, β ∈ R, then αf + βg is also
measurable.
4) If f, g : R → R are measurable functions, then (g ◦ f) (r) = g (f (r)) is
measurable.
5) If f, g : Ω→ R are measurable functions, then max{f, g} and min{f, g} are
measurable.
6) If f : Ω → R is a measurable function, then the absolute value of f , |f |, is
also measurable.
7) If f, g : Ω → R are two functions such that f = g almost everywhere (a.e.)
and f is a measurable function, then g is measurable.
Remark 2.10. f = g almost everywhere means the set Ω = {r ∈ Ω : f (r) 6=
g (r)} is measure zero.
8) Let A be a set, define
XA (r) =
{
1, r ∈ A
0, r /∈ A .
If A is measurable, then XA (r) is also a measurable function.
We now define a probability measure and then state its properties as a proposition.
Definition 2.11.
Let F be a σ-field on Ω. A probability measure P is a mapping
P : F → [0, 1]
such that
Chapter 2. Background 8
i) P (Ω) = 1;
ii) If A1, A2, . . . , An, . . . is any sequence of pairwise disjoint events in F , then
P (∪∞n=1An) =
∞∑
n=1
P (An) .
Proposition 2.12 (Properties of Probability Measures).
1) For any subset A of Ω we have 0 ≤ P (A) ≤ 1.
2) P (Ac) = 1− P (A), where Ac is the complement of A.
3) If A ⊂ B, then P (A) ≤ P (B).
4) For any subsets A and B of Ω we have P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B) −
P (A ∩B).
Definition 2.13.
A probability space is a triple (Ω,F , P ) where Ω is the sample space, F is a σ-field
on Ω and P is the probability measure on F .
Definition 2.14.
The events A and B are said to be independent if P (A ∩B) = P (A)P (B).
Example 2.15.
Let us throw a die with all outcomes equally likely. Then Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},
F = 2Ω and P {i}) = 1
6
for each i. Let A = {3, 5, 6}, B = {1, 4}, C = {1, 2, 3}.
Then we see that P (A) = 1
2
, P (B) = 1
3
and P (C) = 1
2
. Also B ∩ C = {1} and
A ∩ C = {3}. Since P (B ∩ C) = 1
6
= 1
6
= P (B) .P (C), events B and C are
independent. However, since P (A ∩ C) = 1
6
6= 1
4
= P (A) .P (C), events A and C
are not independent.
Definition 2.16.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space and X : Ω → R be F -measurable. Then X
is said to be random variable on (Ω,F , P ).
Remark 2.17.
Proposition 2.6 and Theorem 2.9 can be applied to random variables since random
variables are measurable functions.
Definition 2.18.
Let X : (Ω,F , P )→ R and Y : (Ω¯, F¯ , P¯)→ R be random variables. Then X and
Y are called identically distributed random variables if PX = PY .
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We now define independent random variables.
Definition 2.19.
The random variables X and Y on (Ω,F , P ) are said to be independent if the σ-
fields they generate, FX and FY , are independent.
The following definition is one of the fundamental concepts in probability.
Definition 2.20.
LetX : Ω→ R be a random variable. SupposeX can take values r1, r2, . . . , rn with
corresponding probabilities p (r1) ,p (r2) , . . . ,p (rn). Then the expected value of
the random variable X is given by
E (X) =
n∑
k=1
rkp (rk) .
The expected value of a random variable demonstrates its adjusted average.
Example 2.21.
How many tails would you expect when you tossed a coin three times?
X = number of ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and
p (0) = 1
8
, p (1) = 3
8
, p (2) = 3
8
, p (3) = 1
8
. Therefore, weighted average is
0
1
8
+ 1
3
8
+ 2
3
8
+ 3
1
8
= 1.5
In the following proposition we have listed the properties of expectation.
Proposition 2.22 (Properties of Expectation).
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space. Let X, Y be simple random variables on
(Ω,F , P ), c ∈ R and A ∈ F . Then
1. E[X ± Y ] = E[X]± E[Y ];
2. if X and Y are independent, then E[X.Y ] = E[X].E[Y ];
3. E[cX] = cE[X];
4. if X ≥ 0, then E[X] ≥ 0;
5. if X ≥ Y , then E[X] ≥ E[Y ];
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6. if |X| ≤M on A ∈ F , then |E[X.1A]| ≤M.P (A).
To show the different components in the construction we need to introduce a new
notation by
E[X] :=
∫
Ω
XdP. (2.1)
When X =
∑n
i=1 ri1Ai , (Ai)
n
i=1 is a partition of Ω into F measurable sets and
ri = X (ωi) for any ωi ∈ Ai, by rewriting the integral, we obtain
E[X] =
n∑
i=1
X (ωi)P (Ai) =
∫
Ω
XdP. (2.2)
Example 2.23.
Let Ω = {1, 2, . . . , 7},F = 2Ω, P ({i}) = 1
6
for i = 1, 2, 3 and P ({i}) = 1
8
for
i = 4, 5, 6, 7. Let X (i) = 2i for i ≤ 4, X (i) = i for i > 4 and let A = {2, 4, 5, 7}.
Then∫
A
XdP =
∫
{2,4,5,7}
XdP =
∑
i∈{2,4,5,7}
X (i)P ({i})
= X (2)P ({2}) +X (4)P ({4}) +X (5)P ({5}) +X (7)P ({7})
= 4
1
6
+ 8
1
8
+ 5
1
8
+ 7
1
8
=
19
6
.
We now talk about integrability and its properties for random variables. If X is a
positive random variable on the probability space (Ω,F , P ), define
X [m] (ω) :=
{
X (ω) ifX (ω) < m,
m ifX (ω) ≥ m.
Definition 2.24.
Let X denote a positive random variable on the probability space (Ω,F , P ). If
limm→∞E[X [m]] <∞, we call X an integrable random variable. If X is integrable,
we let
E[X] = lim
m→∞
E[X [m]].
Lemma 2.25.
Let X and Y denote positive random variables on the probability space (Ω,F , P ).
If X is integrable and X = Y almost surely, then Y is integrable and E[X] = E[Y ].
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Definition 2.26.
A random variable X on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) is integrable if its positive
and negative parts, X+ and X−, are both integrable. If X is integrable we let
E[X] := E[X+]− E[X−] =
∫
Ω
X+dP −
∫
Ω
X−dP =
∫
Ω
XdP.
∫
Ω
XdP is called the Lebesgue integral of X over Ω with respect to P and let
L1 (Ω,F , P ) denote the set of all integrable random variables on (Ω,F , P ).
Proposition 2.27.
Let X and Y be random variables on the probability space (Ω,F , P ).
1. X is the pointwise limit of a sequence of FX measurable simple random
variables (Xn)
∞
n=1 such that |Xn| ≤ |X| for all n.
2. X is integrable if and only if |X| is integrable.
3. If X is integrable, then |E[X]| ≤ E[|X|].
4. If |Y | ≤ |X| and X is integrable, then Y is integrable.
5. If X and Y are integrable random variables and c ∈ R, then X ± Y and cX
are integrable.
6. If X and Y are integrable random variables on (Ω,F , P ), then E[X + Y ] =
E[X] + E[Y ].
Proposition 2.28.
If (Ω,F , P ) is a probability space with Ω = (ωn)∞n=1 and F = 2Ω, then X : Ω→ R
is integrable if and only if
∞∑
n=1
|X (ωn) |P ({ωn}) <∞.
If X is integrable
E[X] =
∫
Ω
XdP =
∞∑
n=1
X (ω)P ({ωn}) .
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2.1.2 Convex and Concave Functions
We now take a short break from probability theory and discuss certain properties of
real functions. Such properties are often used when studying financial or economic
problems. In particular, they are used quite often throughout this thesis.
Definition 2.29.
A function φ : (a, b) ⊂ R→ R is convex if for all r1, r2, a < r1 < r2 < b and all t,
0 < t < 1,
φ (tr1 + (1− t) r2) ≤ tφ (r1) + (1− t)φ (r2) . (2.3)
A function φ is said to be (strictly) concave if −φ is (strictly) convex.
Remark 2.30.
For a twice differentiable function f , if the second derivative, f
′′
(r), is positive,
then the graph is convex; if f
′′
(r) is negative, then the graph is concave.
Example 2.31.
Let f1 (r) = r
2. We show that f1 (r) is convex. Following Remark 2.30 we have
f
′′
1 (r) = 2 > 0.
Hence, f1 (r) is convex.
Example 2.32.
Let f2 (r) = ln r, r > 0. We show that f2 (r) is concave. From Remark 2.30 we
have
f
′′
2 (r) = −
1
r2
< 0.
Hence, f2 (r) is concave.
Proposition 2.33.
If φ : (a, b) ⊂ R→ R, then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. φ is convex;
2. if a < r1 < r2 < . . . < rn < b, 0 < ti < 1 and
∑n
i=1 ti = 1, then
φ
(
n∑
i=1
tiri
)
≤
n∑
i=1
tiφ (ri) ; (2.4)
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r1 r2
tr1+(1-t)r2
f(tr1 +(1−t)r2)
tf(r1) +(1−t)f(r2)
Figure 2.1: f1 (r)
r2
r1
f(tr1+(1-t)r2)
tf(r1)+(1-t)f(r2)
tr1+(1-t)r2
Figure 2.2: f2 (r)
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3. if a < r < y < z < b, then
φ (r)− φ (y)
r − y ≤
φ (y)− φ (z)
y − z . (2.5)
Corollary 2.34.
1. If φ is a twice continuously differentiable function defined on (a, b), then φ
is convex if and only if φ
′′ ≥ 0.
2. Convex functions are continuous.
3. If φ : (a, b)→ R is convex, then φ = φ1+φ2 where φ1 is convex and increasing
and φ2 is convex and decreasing.
We now state Jensen’s inequality for concave functions with positive weights.
Proposition 2.35.
For a real concave function φ, numbers r1, r2, . . . , rn in its domain, and positive
weights ai, Jensen’s inequality can be stated as :
φ
(∑
airi∑
aj
)
≥
∑
aiφ (ri)∑
aj
. (2.6)
Let us give an example.
Example 2.36.
Let φ (r) =
√
r. First we show that φ (r) is concave. The second derivative of φ (r)
is negative. Thus, from Remark 2.30 it is concave. Let r1, r2, . . . , rn be positive
numbers. Hence, they are in the domain of φ (r) =
√
r. Let ai, i = 1, . . . , n, be
positive numbers, then Proposition 2.35 implies that√∑
airi∑
aj
≥
∑
ai
√
ri∑
aj
⇐⇒
√
a1r1 + . . .+ anrn√
a1 + . . .+ an
≥ a1
√
r1 + . . .+ an
√
rn
a1 + . . .+ an
.
Example 2.37.
Let φ (r) = ln r. In Example 2.32 we have showed that φ (r) is concave. Let
r1, r2, . . . , rn be positive numbers. Hence, they are in the domain of φ (r) = ln r.
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Let ai, i = 1, . . . , n, be positive numbers, then Proposition 2.35 implies that
ln
(∑
airi∑
aj
)
≥
∑
ai ln (ri)∑
aj
.
This particular function is used frequently in this thesis. In particular this property
is used in Chapter 5.
We now state the following lemma which is proved in [4]. It will be used in the
proof of our main result in Section 4. This is a famous inequality which appears
quite often in problems related to information theory.
Lemma 2.38.
For any vectors (a1, . . . , aK) > 0 and (b1, . . . , bK) ≥ 0 satisfying
∑
ak =
∑
bk = 1,
the following inequality holds
K∑
k=1
ak ln ak −
K∑
k=1
ak ln bk ≥ 0. (2.7)
In particular, if (a1, . . . , aK) 6= (b1, . . . , bK), then
∑
ak ln ak >
∑
ak ln bk.
Proof.
We have
lnx ≤ x− 1,
which implies
lnx
2
= ln
√
x ≤ √x− 1,
and so
− lnx ≥ 2− 2√x.
By using this inequality, we get
K∑
k=1
ak (ln ak − ln bk) = −
K∑
k=1
ak ln
bk
ak
≥
K∑
k=1
ak
(
2− 2
√
bk√
ak
)
= 2− 2
K∑
k=1
√
akbk =
K∑
k=1
(
ak − 2
√
akbk + bk
)
=
K∑
k=1
(√
ak −
√
bk
)2
≥ 0.
If (a1, . . . , aK) 6= (b1, . . . , bK), then
∑K
k=1 ak (ln ak − ln bk) > 0.
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2.1.3 Conditional Expectation
The expectation changes if new information becomes available.
Definition 2.39.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space and let G be a σ-field on Ω generated by a
countable partition (Gn)
∞
n=1 of Ω. Suppose G ⊂ F and P (Gn) > 0 for all n. If X
is an integrable random variable on (Ω,F , P ), let
E[X|G] (ω) = 1
P (Gn)
∫
Gn
XdP (2.8)
for all n and all ω ∈ Gn. E[X|G] is called the conditional expectation of X given
G. If G is generated by a random variable Y on (Ω,F , P ), we also write E[X|Y ]
in place of E[X|FY ].
Proposition 2.40.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space and let G be a σ-field on Ω generated by a
countable partition (Gn)
∞
n=1 of Ω. Suppose G ⊂ F and P (Gn) > 0 for all n. If
X is an integrable random variable on (Ω,F , P ), then E[X|G] is the unique G
measurable integrable random variable on (Ω,F , P ) satisfying∫
A
E[X|G]dP =
∫
A
XdP (2.9)
for all A ∈ G.
In particular, if A = Ω, then
E[E[X|G]] =
∫
Ω
E[X|G]dP =
∫
Ω
XdP = E[X], (2.10)
which means that the average of the averages is the average. The properties of
conditional expectation can be listed by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.41 (Properties of Conditional Expectation).
Let X and Y be integrable random variables on the probability space (Ω,F , P ). Let
c1 and c2 be real numbers and let G and H be σ-fields on Ω where H ⊂ G ⊂ F .
1. If Y is any version of E (X|G) then E (Y ) = E (X).
2. If X is G measurable, then E (X|G) = X a.s.
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3. (Positivity) If X ≥ 0, then E (X|G) ≥ 0, a.s.
4. (Linearity) E[c1X + c2Y |G] = c1E[X|G] + c2E[Y |G].
5. (Taking out what is known) If X.Y is integrable and X is G-measurable,
then
E[X.Y |G] = X.E[Y |G].
6. (Indepence drops out) If X and G are independent, then
E[X|G] = E[X].
7. (Tower Law)
E[E[X|G|H]] = E[X|H].
8. (Jensen’s Inequality) Let φ : R → R be a convex function and let X be
an integrable random variable on (Ω,F , P ) such that φ (X) is also integrable.
Then
φ (E[X|G]) ≤ E[φ (X) |G], (2.11)
for any σ-field G on Ω.
2.2 Stochastic Processes
We now define a stochastic process and a Markov process and then give an example.
Definition 2.42.
A stochastic process is a collection of random variables (Xt)t∈T defined on a prob-
ability space (Ω,F , P ), indexed by a subset T of the real numbers.
If subset T is countable, then the process X is called discrete stochastic process.
If T is uncountable, then it is called continuous stochastic process. The index T
represents time.
Definition 2.43.
For each fixed ω ∈ Ω, the mapping
t→ Xt (ω) ,
defined on index set t ∈ T , is called a sample path (or path).
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Definition 2.44.
Let X = (Xt)t∈T be a stochastic process and (Ft)t∈T be a filtration on (Ω,F , P ).
Then X is adapted to the filtration if Xt is Ft- measurable for all t ∈ T .
Definition 2.45.
A random sequence X1, X2, . . . is called an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) process, if the sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . . is i.i.d..
Theorem 2.46 (Law of Large Numbers).
Let X1, X2, . . . be pairwise independent and identically distributed random vari-
ables, each having the same finite mean µ. Then
P
(
lim
n→∞
1
n
(X1 +X2 + . . .+Xn) = µ
)
= 1.
In other words, the partial averages 1
n
(X1 +X2 + . . .+Xn) converge almost surely
to µ.
The following theorem will be used in the proof of our main result in Chapter 5.
The proof of the theorem can be found in [25].
Theorem 2.47.
Let {Dt, t ≥ 1} be a sequence of random variables and {Ft, t ≥ 1} an increasing
sequence of σ-fields with Dt measurable with respect to Ft for each t. Let D be
a random variable and c be a constant such that E|D| < ∞ and P (|Dt| > x) ≤
cP (|D| > x) for each x ≥ 0 and t ≥ 1. Then
t−1
t∑
i=1
[Di − E (Di|Fi−1)] p−→ 0 (2.12)
as t → ∞. If E (|D| log+ |D|) < ∞, or if the Dt are independent, or if {Dt, t ≥
1} and {E (Dt|Ft−1) , t ≥ 2} are stationary sequences, then the convergence in
probability in (2.12) can be strengthened to a.s. convergence.
Remark 2.48.
The above theorem is a weak version of law of large numbers unlike Theorem
2.46. In Theorem 2.47 the random variables are in general not required to be
i.i.d. This result roughly says that the time average asymptotically equals to the
“conditional”space average.
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Definition 2.49.
A sequence of σ-fields (Fn)∞n=1 on Ω such that
F1 ⊂ F2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ F
is called a filtration.
A filtration means that as the time t increases, the information about an event
increases.
Example 2.50.
For a sequence ψ1, ψ2, . . . of coin tosses we take Ft to be the σ-field generated by
ψ1, ψ2. . . . , ψt,
Ft = σ (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψt) .
Let
A = {the first 7 tosses produce at least one head and at least two tails}.
At time t = 7, we will be able to decide if A belongs to F7. Nevertheless at time
t = 6 it is not possible to tell if A has occurred or not. We have to wait for the
7th toss to decide.
Definition 2.51.
A stochastic process {Xn} where n ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} is called a discrete-time
finite state Markov chain if
P (Xn+1 = j|X0 = c0, . . . , , Xn−1 = cn−1, Xn = i) = P (Xn+1 = j|Xn = i) , (2.13)
for every i, j, c0, . . . , cn−1 and for every n.
The matrix P (Xn+1 = j|Xn = i)j,i∈S is called the transition matrix of the chain
Xn.
Let us give an example.
Example 2.52.
Suppose that a gambler starts with £1 and at each game the gambler wins £1 with
probability p or looses £1 with probability 1−p. The game ends when the gambler
has £7 or looses all his money. This is a Markov chain with its transition matrix
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given by 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1− p 0 p 0 0 0 0 0
0 1− p 0 p 0 0 0 0
0 0 1− p 0 p 0 0 0
0 0 0 1− p 0 p 0 0
0 0 0 0 1− p 0 p 0
0 0 0 0 0 1− p 0 p
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

We now state a definition of Markov process with infinite state spaces.
Definition 2.53.
Let (X,B, λ) be a probability space. A function P : X × B → [0, 1] is called a
stochastic transition function if it has the following properties:
i) for any A ∈ B,P (., A) : X → [0, 1] is a B-measurable function;
ii) for any x ∈ X,P (x, .) : B→ [0, 1] is a measure.
A Markov process can be defined by a transition function P. Let λ be a proba-
bilistic measure on B called initial probability. Then we define all probabilities
related to the Markov process {Xn}n≥0 using λ and P:
P (Xn+1 ∈ A|Xn = r) = P (r, A) ;
P (Xn+1 ∈ A) =
∫
X
. . .
∫
X︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1
dλ (r0)P (r0, dr1)P (r1, dr2) . . .P (rn−1, drn)P (rn, A) .
2.2.1 Discrete Martingales
Definition 2.54.
Let (Fn)∞n=1 be a filtration on the probability space (Ω,F , P ). A sequence (Xn)∞n=1
of random variables on (Ω,F , P ) is called a discrete martingale with respect to
(Fn)∞n=1, if
• Xn is integrable, n = 1, 2, . . .;
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• (Xn)∞n=1 is adapted to (Fn)∞n=1;
• E[Xn+1|Fn] = Xn a.s. for all n = 1, 2, . . . .
Let us give an example for martingales.
Example 2.55.
Let X1, X2, . . . be a sequence of independent random variables with E (Xs) = 0,
for each s. Define
S0 := 0,
Sn := X1 +X2 + . . .+Xn,
F0 := {∅,Ω} ,
Fn := σ (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) .
Then, for n ≥ 1, Sn is adapted to the filtration Fn. Also it is integrable because
E (|Sn|) = E (|X1 +X2 + . . .+Xn|)
≤ E (|X1|) + E (|X2|) + . . .+ E (|Xn|)
<∞.
Moreover,
E (Sn|Fn−1) = E (Sn−1 +Xn|Fn−1)
= E (Sn−1|Fn−1) + E (Xn|Fn−1)
= Sn−1 + E (Xn) = Sn−1,
since Sn−1 is Fn−1-measurable and Xn is independent of Fn−1. Thus Sn is a
martingale with respect to Fn−1.
Definition 2.56.
(Xt)t∈Z is called a martingale-difference sequence with respect to the filtration
{Ft}t∈Z if E|Xt| <∞, Xt is Ft-measurable and
E (Xt|Ft−1) = 0, ∀t ∈ Z.
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2.3 Ergodic Theory
In this section, we recall some definitions from ergodic theory. We follow [35] for
this section.
2.3.1 Invariant Measures and Ergodicity
Definition 2.57.
Suppose (X,F , µ) is a probability space. A transformation τ : X → X is measure-
preserving if τ is measurable and
µ
(
τ−1 (A)
)
= µ (A) ,
for all A ∈ F .
Let us give an example.
Example 2.58.
In this example we show that the doubling map τ (r) = 2r mod1 preserves Lebesgue
measure m, i.e., µ (τ−1 (A)) = µ (A), for all A ∈ F .
First,
τ−1 (a, b) = {r|τ (r) ∈ (a, b)}
=
(
a
2
,
b
2
)
∪
(
a+ 1
2
,
b+ 1
2
)
.
Therefore,
m
(
τ−1 (A)
)
= m
((
a
2
,
b
2
)
∪
(
a+ 1
2
,
b+ 1
2
))
b
2
− a
2
+
b+ 1
2
− a+ 1
2
b− a = m ((a, b)) .
Definition 2.59.
Let (X,F , µ) be a measure space. A measure-preserving transformation τ of
(X,F , µ) is called ergodic if the only members A of F with τ−1A = A satisfy
µ (A) = 0 or µ (A) = 1.
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Figure 2.3: τ (r)
Example 2.60.
Let us show that the doubling map τ (r) = 2r mod1 is ergodic with respect to
Lebesgue measure m. Let N be a standard dyadic interval at scale n, i.e., an inter-
val of type
(
a
2n
,
a+ 1
2n
)
, a ∈ Z. If A is any measurable set, then m (τ−nA ∩N) =
2−nm (A). If A is τ -invariant, then m (A ∩N) = 2−nm (A). This means the
relative density of A on N is m (A). If m (A) is not equal to 0 or 1, then this
contradicts the Lebesgue density theorem.
We now state a major result in ergodic theory.
Theorem 2.61 (Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem).
Let (X,F , µ) be a measure space and let τ : X → X be a measure-preserving
transformation. Then, for each f ∈ L1 (µ), there exists a function f ∗ ∈ L1 (µ)
such that f ∗ (τ (r)) = f ∗ (r), r ∈ X µ-a.e. and
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
f
(
τ i (r)
)
= f ∗ (r) , ∀r ∈ X, µ− a.e. (2.14)
Furthermore, if µ (X) <∞, then ∫
X
f ∗dµ =
∫
X
fdµ.
If τ is ergodic, then f ∗ is constant a.e. and so if µ (X) <∞ f ∗ = 1
µ(X)
∫
fdµ a.e.
If (X,F , µ) is a probability space and τ is ergodic we have ∀f ∈ L1 (µ),
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
f
(
τ i (r)
)
=
∫
fdµ a.e.
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The Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem shows that the asymptotic behaviour of the fre-
quencies of the iterates τn (r) of r. The limit in (2.14) of the time average of f
exists for a.e. r and the limit function f ∗ is integrable and measure-preserving.
2.3.2 Lyapunov Exponents
Definition 2.62.
A manifold is a topological space that is locally Euclidean (i.e., around every point,
there is a neighbourhood that is topologically the same as the open unit ball in
Rn).
Euclidean space is the basic example of a manifold. Also, any smooth boundary
of a subset of Euclidean space is a manifold, such as circle, sphere, etc. We can
show that a circle is a manifold.
Example 2.63.
A circle is given by
C1 = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x2 + y2 = 1}
is a manifold of dimension one. A possible atlas is
K = {(H1, α1) , (H2, α2)}
where
H1 = C
1 \ {(−1, 0)}, α1 (x, y) = arctan y
x
with − pi < α1 < pi
H2 = C
1 \ {(1, 0)}, α2 (x, y) = arctan y
x
with 0 < α2 < 2pi.
Definition 2.64.
SupposeM is a Cs manifold (s ≥ 1) and r is a point inM . Pick a chart Φ : U → Rn
where U is an open subset ofM containing r. Suppose two curves Y1 : (−1, 1)→M
and Y2 : (−1, 1) → M with Y1 = Y2 = r are given such that ΦY1 and ΦY2 are
both differentiable at 0. Then Y1 and Y2 are called equivalent at 0 if the ordinary
derivatives of ΦY1 and ΦY2 at 0 coincide. This defines an equivalence relation on
such curves, and the equivalence classes are known as the tangent vectors of M at
r. The equivalence class of the curve Y is written as Y
′
(0). The tangent space of
M at r, denoted by TrM , is defined as the set of all tangent vectors.
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We now define the Lyapunov exponents . We use [32] for the following definition
and Oseledec’s Multiplicative Ergodic Theorem.
Definition 2.65.
Let f : M → M be an endomorphism on a manifold M of dimension m. Let |.|
be the norm on tangent vectors induced by a Riemannian metric on M . For each
r ∈M and v ∈ TrM let
l (r, v) = lim
t→∞
1
t
ln
(|Df trv|) , (2.15)
whenever the limit exists.
Let us give an example.
Example 2.66.
Let
τ (r) =
{
2r 0 ≤ r < 1
2
,
2− 2r 1
2
≤ r ≤ 1
be a map. If r0 is such that rj = T
j (r0) =
1
2
for some j, then l (r0) is not defined
because its derivative does not exist. This kind of points make up a countable set.
For other points r0 ∈ [0, 1],
|f ′ (rj) | = 2 for all j.
Therefore, the Lyapunov exponent is l (r0) = log 2.
We now state the following theorem.
Theorem 2.67 (Oseledec’s Multiplicative Ergodic Theorem).
Let M be a compact manifold of dimension m, B be the σ-algebra generates by the
Borel subsets of M , and f : M → M be a C2 diffeomorphism. Then there is an
invariant set Bf ∈ B of full measure for every µ ∈ M (f), where µ ∈ M (f) is
the set of all invariant Borel probability measures for f , such that the Lyapunov
exponents exist for all points r ∈ Bf .
More precisely the following are true.
a) The set Bf is
i) invariant,
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ii) of full measure, µ (Bf ) = 1 for all µ ∈M (f).
b) For each r ∈ Bf , the tangent space at r can be written as an increasing set
of subspaces
{0} = V 0r ⊂ V 1r ⊂ . . . V m(r)r = TrM
such that
i) for v ∈ V jr V j−1r the limit defining l (r, v) exists and lj (r) = l (r, v) is
the same value for all such v,
ii) the bundle of subspaces
{V jr : r ∈ Bf and m (r) ≥ j}
are invariant in the sense that DfrV
j
r = V
j
f(r) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m (r).
c) The function m : Bf → {1, . . . , s} is a measurable function and invariant,
m ◦ f = m.
d) If r ∈ Bf , the exponents satisfy
−∞ ≤ l1 (r) < l2 (r) < . . . < lm(r) (r) .
For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the function lj (.) is
i) defined and measurable on the set
{r ∈ B)f : s (r) ≥ j},
ii) is invariant, lj ◦ f = lj.
2.4 Background from Finance and Economics
In this section we state definitions that we use in this thesis. We mostly have used
the book [24] for the definitions.
Definition 2.68.
An asset is a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from
which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity. We use two
types of assets in this thesis.
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• A short-lived asset is an asset that the investor plans to hold it for short
period of time, such as cash, securities, bank accounts etc.
• A long-lived asset is to be held for many years and are not intended to be
disposed of in the near future, such as bonds, common stock etc.
2.4.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
CAPM is a model which defines the relationship between expected return and risk.
It is used to determine the pricing of risky securities.
2.4.1.1 Notation
• Asset prices are vectors denoted by
pt = (pt,1, . . . , pt,K) .
• Asset returns are random vectors denoted by
R = (R1, . . . , RK) ,
where Rk =
p1,k−p0,k
p0,k
. Here, 0 means the zero vector of dimension K. We use
boldface font for K + 1 dimensional vector, for instance,
R = (R0, R1, . . . , RK) .
k = 0 will be assumed to be risk-free, i.e., its return R0 = r > 0 non-random
number.
• Investor’s portfolio is characterised by a vector
x = (x1, . . . , xK) ,
x = (x0, x1, . . . , xK) .
• The vector of expected returns on the assets
m = (m1, . . . ,mK) ,
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where mk = ERk,
m = (r,m1, . . . ,mK) .
• The K ×K covariance matrix V = (σkj), where
σkj = Cov (Rk, Rj)
= E (RkRj)− E (Rk)E (Rj) .
The matrix V is positive definite. Thus, its inverse W := V−1 exists.
• The return on a normalized portfolio x is denoted by Rx = 〈R,x〉.
• The expected return on x is denoted by mx.
• The variance of a portfolio return is denoted by σ2x.
• η ≥ 0 is the risk tolerance of the investor.
2.4.1.2 CAPM Equation
The Markowitz portfolio selection problem
max
x∈RK+1
{2ηERx − V arRx} (2.16)
subject to
〈e,x〉 = 1
has a unique solution x∗η given by
x∗η = x
MIN + ηy∗,
where xMIN = (1, 0, . . . , 0), y∗ = (y∗0, y
∗), y∗0 = rC − A, y∗ = W (m− re), where
A = 〈e,Wm〉, B = 〈m,Wm〉, C = 〈e,We〉 and D = BC − A2 ([30]).
Theorem 2.69.
Let x∗η be a solution of (2.16). Then for each k = 1, . . . , K, the following equation
holds:
ERk − r = Cov (Rk,Rx)
V arRx
(ERx − r) . (2.17)
The equation (2.17) is called capital asset pricing model (CAPM) ([28]).
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2.4.2 Game Theory
Game theory focuses on situations in which a group of people interact. It was
found by the mathematician John von Neumann. The first book was The Theory
of Games and Economic Behaviour. Game theory is firstly used in economics to
understand a collection of economic behaviour which includes markets, firms and
consumers. Then it is extended to psychology, political science, biology and logic.
It is the formal study of decision-making where many decision-makers must make
choices which affect the other players’ interests. The games analysed in game
theory are well-defined mathematical tools. It consists of players, payoffs and
strategies of players. Let us start by describing the game in a formal language.
Definition 2.70.
A game is a formal model of an interactive situation which consists of players,
actions, payoffs and information. These are known as the rules of the game.
Definition 2.71.
i) Players are the individuals who make decisions. Their aim is to maximise
utility by choice of actions.
ii) The payoff of a player i is the expected utility he/she receives as a function
of the strategies chosen by himself/herself and the other players.
iii) A strategy of player i is a rule that tells him/her which action to choose at
each instant of the game, given his/her information set.
iv) A strategy profile
(
λ1t , . . . , λ
I
t
)
is a list consisting of one strategy for each of
the I players in the game.
Let us give an example of game. This game is called stag hunt in game theory.
Also this game is an example of a symmetric game. The following Examples 2.72,
2.75, 2.76 and 2.77 are well-known in game theory. Details can be found in [24, 31].
Example 2.72 (Stug Hunt).
There are two hunters decide to go out for hunting. Each can individually choose
to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Each hunter does not know the other hunter’s choice
while they choose what to hunt. If one of the hunters hunts a stag, then he must
have the cooperation of the other hunter in order to succeed. A hunter can chooses
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a hare by himself, but stag’s meat is much better than a hare’s meat. The payoff
matric is given as the following.
(Hunter 2 (stag) Hunter 2 (hare)
Hunter 1 (stag) (9, 9) (0, 6)
Hunter 1 (hare) (6, 0) (4, 4)
)
In the above payoff matrix we see that if the both hunters hunt a stag both will get
a payoff 9. But if the Hunter 1 hunts a stag and Hunter 2 hunts a hare, then the
first one gets a payoff 0 and second hunter gets a payoff 6. If they both hunt a
hare they will both get a payoff 4.
Definition 2.73.
The normal-form representation of an I-player game specifies the players’ strategy
spaces λ1t , . . . , λ
I
t and their payoff functions u1, . . . , uI . We denote this game by
G = {λ1t , . . . , λIt ;u1, . . . , uI}.
We now define a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.74.
In the I-player normal-form game G = {λ1t , . . . , λIt ;u1, . . . , uI}, the strategies(
λ¯1t , . . . , λ¯
I
t
)
are a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, λ¯it is player i’s best response
to the strategies specified for the I − 1 other players, (λ¯1t , . . . , λ¯i−1t , λ¯i+1t , . . . , λ¯It ):
ui
(
λ¯1t , . . . , λ¯
i−1
t , λ¯
i+1
t , . . . , λ¯
I
t
) ≥ ui (λ¯1t , . . . , λ¯i−1t , λ¯it, λ¯i+1t , . . . , λ¯It ) (2.18)
for every feasible strategy λit; that is, λ¯
i
t solves
max
λit
ui
(
λ¯1t , . . . , λ¯
i−1
t , λ¯
i
t, λ¯
i+1
t , . . . , λ¯
I
t
)
. (2.19)
Let us give a famous example in game theory which is called prisoner’s dilemma,
where it has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Example 2.75 (Prisoner’s Dilemma).
Each prisoner obtains a higher payoff when he betrays the other prisoner, no mat-
ter what the other prisoner decides. If both prisoner cooperate and stay silent then
they will be charged for 1 year. If both prisoners confess then this time they will
be charged for 5 years. However, if the prisoner, say A, betrays the other and
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prisoner B stays silent, then the prisoner A will be free and the prisoner B will be
charged for 10 years, or vice versa. The payoff matrix is represented as below.
(Prisoner B (cooperate) Prisoner B (confess)
Prisoner A (cooperate) (1, 1) (10, 0)
Prisoner A (confess) (0, 10) (5, 5)
)
Therefore both way, confessing makes sense, as it would for the other prisoner.
So, the Nash equilibrium is formed at 5 years for each.
Let us show an other example where the game has two Nash equilibrium. This
game is known as battle of the sexes in game theory.
Example 2.76 (Battle of the Sexes).
A girl and a boy want to go out together for a meeting this evening. There are two
activities in town; dancing and cricket match. However, they will not communi-
cate before the meeting. The girl wants to go for dancing. The boy wants to go
to the cricket match. But they prefer being together rather that being alone. The
payoff matrix of the game is the following.
(Boy (dance) Boy (cricket)
Girl (dance) (4, 3) (0, 0)
Girl (cricket) (0, 0) (3, 4)
)
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibrium. One is both going out for
dancing and the other is both going out to watch the cricket match.
We can now illustrate an example where the game has no Nash equilibrium. This
game is known as matching pennies in game theory.
Example 2.77 (Matching Pennies).
This game is played between two players; Player 1 and Player 2. Each player
has a penny and must secretly turn the penny to heads or tails. Then the players
show their choices simultaneously. If the pennies match (both heads or tails), then
Player 1 wins the Player 2’s penny. If the pennies do not match (one heads and
one tails), then Player 2 wins thePlayer 1’s penny. The payoff matrix of this game
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is given as the following.
(Player 2 (heads) Player 2 (tails)
Player 1 (heads) (+1,−1) (−1,+1)
Player 2 (tails) (−1,+1) (+1,−1)
)
In this game there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Because there is no pair of
pure strategies such that neither player would want to switch if told the player what
the other player would do. Furthermore, this game is an example of a zero-sum
game. Because one of the players’ gain is equal to the other player’s loss.
Chapter 3
Random Dynamical Systems
In this section, we recall some definitions from the theory of random dynamical
systems. In this section we mainly follow [5].
Definition 3.1.
A measurable dynamical system (θ (t))t∈T on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) for
which each θ (t) is an endomorphism is called a measure preserving or metric
dynamical system and is denoted by Σ =
(
Ω,F , P, (θ (t))t∈T
)
or, for short, by
θ (.).
Definition 3.2.
A measurable random dynamical system on the measurable system (X,B) over (or
covering or extending) a metric dynamical system
(
Ω,F , P, (θ (t))t∈T
)
with time
T is a mapping
φ : T × Ω×X → X, (t, ω, r) 7→ φ (t, ω, r) ,
with the following properties:
i) Measurability : φ is B (T )⊗F ⊗ B,B-measurable.
ii) Cocycle property : The mappings φ (t, ω) := φ (t, ω, .) : X → X form a
cocycle over θ (.), i.e. they satisfy
φ (0, ω) = idr for all ω ∈ Ω (if 0 ∈ T ) ,
φ (t+ s, ω) = φ (t, θ (s)ω) ◦ φ (s, ω) for all s, t ∈ T ω ∈ Ω,
33
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where “◦ ”means composition.
3.1 Random Maps With Constant Probabilities
We now define the notion of a random map (also called an iterated function system
with probabilities) and state some results from [8] for a certain class of iterated
function systems. Random maps are a special type of random dynamical systems.
Let S be a finite set, S = {s1, . . . , sL}. Let p be a probability distribution on S
such that ps > 0 for all s ∈ S and τs : X → X be measurable. The collection
F = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τL; p1,p2, . . . ,pL}
is called a random map or an iterated function system (IFS) with probabilities.
We denote the space of sequences ω = {s1, s2, . . .}, sl ∈ S, by Ω. The topology on
Ω is defined as the product topologies on S. The Borel measure on Ω is defined
as the product measure pN. Moreover, we write
st := (s1, s2, . . . , st)
for the history (information) up to time t.
Formally F is understood as a Markov process with a transition function
P (r, A) =
L∑
s=1
psXA (τs (r)) ,
where A ∈ B and XA is the characteristic function of the set A. Intuitively, this
means that at each time step
F (r) = τs (r)
with probability ps; i.e., at each time step, one transformation τs is selected with
probability ps and applied to the process.
Example 3.3.
Let S = {1, 2}, i.e., S consists of two symbols. Then F = {τ1, τ2;p1,p2}. Let us
consider a specific example where X = [0, 1]. Suppose that the formulae of τ1, τ2
are given by
τ1 (r) = 4r (1− r) ,
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and
τ2 (r) =
{
2r 0 ≤ r < 1
2
,
2− 2r 1
2
≤ r ≤ 1,
and p1 = p2 =
1
2
.
Figure 3.1: τ1 (r)
Figure 3.2: τ2 (r)
For instance, when we take r = 3
5
, then we can see how a random orbit looks like
at time t = 1, 2 by the following diagram.
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r = 3
5
τ2
(
3
5
)
= 4
5
τ2
(
4
5
)
= 2
5
p
2 = 1
4
τ1
(
4
5
)
= 16
25p1 =
1
4
p
2 = 1
2
τ1
(
3
5
)
= 24
25
τ2
(
24
25
)
= 23
25
p
2 = 1
4
τ1
(
24
25
)
= 96
625p1 =
1
4
p1
=
1
2
3.1.1 Skew Products
A random map can be realised as a skew product (deterministic map) on the
extended phase space:
R (r, w) : X × Ω→ X × Ω
given by
R (r, w) = (τw1r, σw) ,
where Ω is the space of one-sided sequences w = {w1, w2, . . .}, wi ∈ {1, . . . , K}
and (σw)i = wi+1 is the left-shift map.
3.1.2 Random Homeomorphisms on [0, 1]
In [8], the following random map was studied. Let
F = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τL; p1,p2, . . . ,pL}
such that
i) τs : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
ii) τs is continuous and increasing,
iii) τs (0) = 0 and τs (1) = 1.
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Let rt (s
t) denote
rt
(
st
)
:= τst ◦ τst−1 ◦ . . . ◦ τs1 (r0) ,
where st := (s1, s2, . . . , st) , si ∈ S.
Example 3.4.
Let S = {1, 2}, i.e., S is the space of two symbols. Then F = {τ1, τ2;p1,p2}.
Suppose that the formulae of τ1, τ2 are given by
τ1 (r) = r
2,
and
τ2 (r) =
√
r,
with p1 =
1
3
and p2 =
2
3
.
Figure 3.3: τs (r) , s = 1, 2
One can easily check that the transformations τ1 (r) and τ2 (r) satisfy the properties
of the random map in [8].
3.1.3 Representation of Random Homeomorphisms
For such random map, one can easily observe (see Lemma 4.2. [8]) that each
constituent map of the random map can be represented as follows:
τs (r) = r
βs(r),
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with βs (r) satisfying;
1. βs (r) > 0 in (0, 1);
2. (ln r) βs (r) increasing;
3. limr→0 (ln r) βs (r) = −∞;
4. limr→1 (ln r) βs (r) = 0.
Among other results the following proposition can be found in [8]. Let
αt := βs (rt−1) with probability ps, t = 1, 2, . . . .
Proposition 3.5.
Let F = {τs;ps}s∈S be a random map such that τs (r) = rβs(r). Assume that
0 < bs ≤ βs (r) ≤ Bs < ∞ for all r ∈ [0, 1]. If E (lnαt | st−1) ≤ 0 a.s., then
limt→∞ rt (st) 6= 0 a.s.
With Proposition 3.5 we say that the investor will dominate the market or at least
survive. This proposition will be used in our main result in Section 5.4.
3.2 Random Maps With Position Dependent Prob-
abilities
(X,B (X) , µ) will denote a measure space, where B (X) is a σ-algebra of subsets
of X and µ is a probability measure on (X,B). In particular, (I,B (I) ,m) will
be the unit interval I = [0, 1), with B (I) the Borel σ-algebra on I and m being
Lebesgue measure on (I,B (I)). For s = 1, . . . , L, let τs : X → X be measurable
transformations and ps : X → I be measurable functions such that
∑L
s=1 ps (r) =
1, that is, a measurable partition of unity.
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3.2.1 Position dependent random maps
We let F = {τ1, . . . , τL; p1, . . . ,pL} denote the associated random map. A random
map is more precisely a discrete time Markov process with transition function
P (r, A) =
L∑
s=1
ps (r)XA (τs (r)) ,
where XA denotes the characteristic function of a measurable set A.
3.2.2 A Deterministic Representation For Position Depen-
dent Random Maps
Following [6] we can represent the position dependent random map by a skew
product as follows. This deterministic representation represents the position de-
pendent random map on the extended phase space X × I where I is the unit
interval which accounts for the noise space. We make use of the following simple
lemma:
Lemma 3.6. Let Y and Z be a measurable spaces and let (Js)s∈κ be a finite
(or countable), measurable partition of Y . For each s ∈ κ, assume that Fs is a
measurable map from Js to Z. Then the piecewise-defined map F : Y → Z defined
by F (r) = Fs (r) if r ∈ Js is measurable.
In our construction, Y = Z = X × I and the set Js will be given by Js = {(r, w) :∑
i<s pi (r) ≤ w ≤
∑
i≤s pi (r)}. We define maps ϕs : Js → I by
ϕs (r, w) =
1
ps (r)
w −
∑s−1
l=1 pl (r)
ps (r)
. (3.1)
The maps Fs are defined on Js by Fs (r, w) = (τs (r) , ϕs (r, w)). By
ϕr (w) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
we will denote the piecewise linear expanding map, whose L branches are given
by
ϕs (r, w) , s = 1, . . . , L.
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It is well known ([35]) that for such a piecewise linear expanding map Lebesgue
measure is invariant and ergodic. Define the skew product transformation R :
X × I → X × I by
R (r, w) = (τs (r) , ϕs,r (w)) , (3.2)
for (r, w) ∈ Js. R is then B (X)×B (I)-measurable.
We give the following example.
Example 3.7. Let T be a random map which is given by {τ1, τ2;p1 (r) ,p2 (r)}
where
τ1 (r) =
{
2r 0 ≤ r ≤ 1
2
,
r 1
2
< r ≤ 1,
τ2 (r) =
{
r + 1
2
0 ≤ r ≤ 1
2
,
2r − 1 1
2
< r ≤ 1;
and
p1 (r) =
{
2
3
0 ≤ r ≤ 1
2
,
1
3
1
2
< r ≤ 1,
p2 (r) =
{
1
3
0 ≤ r ≤ 1
2
,
2
3
1
2
< r ≤ 1.
Then, R (r, w) is given by:
R (r, w) =

(
2r, 3
2
w
)
for (r, w) ∈ [0, 1
2
]× [0, 2
3
]
(r, 3w) for (r, w) ∈ (1
2
, 1]× [0, 1
3
](
2r − 1, 3
2
w − 1
2
)
for (r, w) ∈ (1
2
, 1]× (1
3
, 1](
r + 1
2
, 3w − 2) for (r, w) ∈ [0, 1
2
]× (2
3
, 1].
3.2.3 Lyapunov Exponents of an Endomorphism
In this subsection, we recall the definition of Lyapunov exponents of an endomor-
phism [32].
Definition 3.8.
Let f : M → M be an endomorphism on a manifold M of dimension m. Let |.|
be the norm on tangent vectors induced by a Riemannian metric on M . For each
r ∈M and v ∈ TrM let
l (r, v) = lim
t→∞
1
t
ln
(|Df trv|) , (3.3)
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whenever the limit exists.
Remark 3.9.
The multiplicative ergodic theorem of Oseledec [32] says that, for almost all r ∈M :
i) the limit in (3.3) exists for all tangent vectors v ∈ TrM , and
ii) there are at most m distinct values of l (r, v) for one point r.
Let m (r) be the number of distinct values of l (r, v) at r for v ∈ TrM , with tangent
vectors vj ∈ TrM for 1 ≤ j ≤ m (r) giving distinct values:
lj (r) = l
(
r, vj
)
with
l1 (r) < l2 (r) . . . < lm(r) (r) .
These distinct values are called the Lyapunov exponents at r.
3.3 Computing the Lyapunov exponents of the
skew product
In this section, we are going to assume that X = [0, 1] and that
τs : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
are differentiable maps. In the next proposition, we will obtain formulae for the
Lyapunov exponents of the skew product R.
Proposition 3.10.
Let R : [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1]× [0, 1] be defined as in (3.2). Then
1.
l1 (r, w) ≥ lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
ln |τ ′si
(
τsi−1 (r)
) |,
2.
l2 (r, w) = lim
t→∞
1
t
ln
1
pst−1
(
τst−2 ◦ τst−3 . . . τs0 (r)
) . . . 1
ps0 (r)
.
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Proof.
For (r, w) ∈ Js we have
R (r, w) = (τs (r) , ϕs,r (w)) .
Let us first compute the derivative matrix of R. We have
A (r, w) =
[
τ
′
s0
(r) 0
∂
∂r
ϕs0,r (w)
∂
∂w
ϕs0,r (w)
]
.
Let v1 =
(
1
0
)
, then
A (r, w) v1 =
(
τ
′
s0
(r)
∂
∂r
ϕs0,r (w)
)
. (3.4)
Also
A (R (r, w)) =
[
τ
′
s1
(τs0 (r)) 0
∂
∂r
ϕs1,τs0 (r) (ϕs0,r (w))
∂
∂w
ϕs1,τs0 (r) (ϕs0,r (w))
]
. (3.5)
Therefore, by (3.4) and (3.5) we have
A (R (r, w))A (r, w) v1 =(
τ
′
s1
(τs0 (r)) τ
′
s0
(r)
∂
∂r
ϕs1,τs0 (r) (ϕs0,r (w)) τ
′
s0
(r) + ∂
∂w
ϕs1,τs0 (r) (ϕs0,r (w))
∂
∂r
ϕs0,r (w)
)
. (3.6)
Thus, in general, we have
A
(
Rt−1 (r, w)
)
. . . A (R (r, w))A (r, w) v1 =
(
A1
A2
)
, (3.7)
where
A1 = τ
′
st−1
(
τst−2 (r)
)
. . . τ
′
s1
(τs0 (r)) τ
′
s0
(r)
and A2 includes terms which are analogous to the second component in (3.6).
Therefore, using (3.7) we obtain
‖A (Rt−1 (r, w)) . . . A (R (r, w))A (r, w) v1‖
≥ |τ ′st−1
(
τst−2 (r)
)
. . . τ
′
s1
(τs0 (r)) τ
′
s0
(r) |. (3.8)
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Since ln is an increasing function, using (3.8), we obtain
l1 (r, w) ≥ lim
t→∞
1
t
ln |τ ′st−1
(
τst−2 (r)
)
. . . τ
′
s1
(τs0 (r)) τ
′
s0
(r) |
= lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
ln |τ ′si
(
τsi−1 (r)
) |,
where we have used the notation τs−1 (r) = r. For l2 (r, w), we first compute
A (r, w) v2, where v2 =
(
0
1
)
. We have
A (r, w) v2 =
(
0
∂
∂w
ϕs0,r (w)
)
,
and by (3.5)
A (R (r, w))A (r, w) v2 =
(
0
∂
∂w
ϕs1,τs0 (r) (ϕs0,r (w))
∂
∂w
ϕs0,r (w)
)
.
Thus, in general, we have
A
(
Rt−1 (r, w)
)
. . . A (R (r, w))A (r, w) v2 = 0
∂
∂w
ϕst−1,τst−2◦...◦τs0 (r)
(
ϕst−2,τst−3◦...◦τs0 (w)
)
. . . ∂
∂w
ϕs0,r (w)
 . (3.9)
Moreover, by the definition of ϕs,r (w) (see (3.1)), we have
∂
∂w
ϕs,r (w) =
1
ps (r)
. (3.10)
Therefore, by (3.9) and (3.10) we have
l2 (r, w) = lim
t→∞
1
t
ln
1
pst−1
(
τst−2 ◦ . . . ◦ τs0 (r)
) . . . 1
ps0 (r)
.
The next proposition shows that at common fixed points of maps τs, the Lyapunov
exponents have more precise formulae.
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Proposition 3.11.
Let r0 be a common fixed point for all the constituent maps τs; i.e., τs (r0) = r0 for
all s ∈ S. Then
1. l1 (r0, w) ≥
∑L
s=1 ps (r0) ln |τ
′
s (r0) |
2. l2 (r0, w) = −
∑L
s=1 ps (r0) lnps (r0)
Proof.
By Proposition 3.10, since τs (r0) = r0, we have
l1 (r0, w) ≥ lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
ln |τ ′si (r0) |, (3.11)
where s0 → s1 → . . .→ st−1 is the orbit of s0 generated by the map ϕr0 (w). Since
Lebesgue measure m is ϕr0-invariant and ergodic, we can use the Birkhoff Ergodic
Theorem and (3.11) to obtain that
l1 (r0, w) ≥ lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
ln |τ ′si (r0) |
=
∫ 1
0
ln |τ ′w (r0) |dm (w) . (3.12)
Write m := mr0 to associate [0, 1] with the particular partition of ϕr0 . Then, using
the partition Js defined in Subsection 3.2.2 and (3.12) we get
l1 (r0, w) ≥
∫ 1
0
ln |τ ′w (r0) |dmr0 (w)
=
L∑
s=1
∫
Js
ln |τ ′w (r0) |dmr0 (w)
=
L∑
s=1
ps (r0) ln |τ
′
s (r0) |.
Similarly, for l2 (r0, w), we use Proposition 3.10 and Birkhoff Ergodic Theorem to
obtain that
l2 (r0, w) = −
∫ 1
0
ln pw (r0) dmr0
= −
L∑
s=1
ps (r0) ln ps (r0) .
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Remark 3.12.
Obviously, we always have l2 (r0, w) > 0. Thus, if l1 (r0, w) > 0 then nearby points
cannot be attracted to (r0, w) under the dynamics of R. In particular, this will
mean that nearby points r ∈ [0, 1] cannot be attracted to r0 under the dynamics
of the random map F .
Chapter 4
An Evolutionary Market Model
With Short-lived Assets
We first recall the model of [21].
4.1 The Model
Let S is finite set and st ∈ S, t = 1, 2, . . ., be the states of the world at date t.
Let p be a probability distribution on S such that for all s ∈ S, ps > 0. s1, s2, . . .
are independent but their probability distribution will change at each time step
according to the money invested in the assets. This will be made more explicit
later in the model.
There are i = 1, . . . , I investors initially endowed with wealth wi0 > 0 and K short-
lived assets k = 1, . . . , K live for one period only and reborn in every period. They
yield the non-negative return Dk (s) at state s, and we assume that Dk (s) 6= 0 for
at least one s. Moreover, we assume that
∑
kDk (s) > 0 for all s.
At each time t, every investor i selects a portfolio
xit
(
st
)
=
(
xit,1
(
st
)
, . . . , xit,K
(
st
)) ∈ RK+ ,
where xit,k is the number of units of asset k in the portfolio x
i
t = x
i
t (s
t), (st) =
(s1, . . . , st). We assume that for each moment of time t ≥ 1 and each random
46
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situation st, the market for every asset k clears:
I∑
i=1
xit,k
(
st
)
= 1. (4.1)
Each investor is endowed with initial wealth wi0 > 0. Wealth w
i
t+1 of investor i at
time t+ 1 can be computed as follows:
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Dk (st+1)x
i
t,k. (4.2)
Total market wealth at time t+ 1 is equal to
Wt+1 =
I∑
i=1
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Dk (st+1) . (4.3)
Investment strategies are characterised in terms of investment proportions:
Λi = {λi0, λi1, . . .}
of K-dimensional vector functions λit =
(
λit,1, . . . , λ
i
t,K
)
, λit,k = λ
i
t,k (s
t), t ≥ 0,
satisfying λit,k ≥ 0,
∑K
k=1 λ
i
t,k = 1. Here, λ
i
t,k stands for the share of the budget w
i
t
of investor i that is invested into asset k at time t. In general λit,k may depend on
(st) = (s1, . . . , st). Given strategies Λ
i = {λi0, λi1, . . .} of investors i = 1, . . . , I, the
equation
pt,k.1 =
I∑
i=1
λit,kw
i
t (4.4)
determines the market clearing price pt,k = pt,k (s
t) of asset k. The number of
units of asset k in the portfolio of investor i at time t is equal to
xit,k =
λit,kw
i
t
pt,k
. (4.5)
Therefore
xit,k =
λit,kw
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kw
j
t
. (4.6)
By using (4.6) and (4.2), we get
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Dk (st+1)
λit,kw
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kw
j
t
. (4.7)
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Since wi0 > 0, we obtain w
i
t > 0 for each t. The main focus of the model is on the
analysis of the dynamics of the market shares of the investors
rit =
wit
Wt
, i = 1, . . . , I.
Using (4.7) and (4.3), we obtain
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk (st+1)
λit,kr
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
, i = 1, . . . , I, (4.8)
where
Rk (st+1) =
Dk (st+1)∑K
m=1Dm (st+1)
are the relative (normalised) payoffs of the assets k = 1, 2, . . . , K. We have
Rk (s) ≥ 0 and
∑
k Rk (s) = 1.
Define
λ∗k := ERk (st) , k = 1, . . . , K, (4.9)
and put
λ∗ = (λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
K) ,
where E (.) is the expectation with respect to the underlying probability on P .
The portfolio rule λ∗ is called the Kelly rule.
Assume I = 2. Then the random dynamical system (4.8) reduces to
r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk (st+1)
λt,kr
1
t
λt,kr1t + λ¯t,k (1− r1t )
, (4.10)
where λt,k is the strategy of investor 1 and λ¯t,k is the strategy of investor 2. We
will assume that the probability function on S is a function of the relative wealth,
r, that the states s1, . . . , sL are independent.
Lemma 4.1.
The random dynamical system in (4.10) can be represented by a random map
F = {τs;ps (r)}Ls=1, where
τs (r) =
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λt,kr
λt,kr + λ¯t,k (1− r)
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such that:
1. τs : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
2. τs (0) = 0 and τs (1) = 1,
3. τs is differentiable.
The proof of Lemma 4.1-(3) is in Appendix A.1.
4.1.1 Notions in Evolutionary Finance
Definition 4.2.
In the theory of evolutionary finance there are three possibilities for investor i :
1. Extinction; i.e., limt→∞ rit = 0 a.s.
2. Survival; i.e., lim supt→∞ r
i
t > 0 a.s. but lim inft→∞ r
i
t < 1 a.s.
3. Domination; i.e., limt→∞ rit = 1 a.s.
We have used [22] for the following two definitions.
Definition 4.3.
A portfolio rule λi is called evolutionarily stable, if for every portfolio rule λj 6= λi
there is a random variable  > 0 such that limt→∞ ϕi (t, ω, r) = 1 for all ri ≥
1−  (ω) almost surely.
Definition 4.4.
A portfolio rule λi is called locally evolutionarily stable, if there exists a random
variable δ (ω) > 0 such that λi is evolutionarily stable for all portfolio rules λj 6= λi
with ‖λi (ω)− λj (ω) ‖ < δ (ω) for all ω.
4.2 Literature Review
In this section we review some recent results from evolutionary finance with short-
lived assets. Firstly, we start with the general case where all the investors use
dynamic strategies.
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4.2.1 Dynamic Investment Strategies
4.2.1.1 CAPM Decision Rule
Amir et. al [2] analysed the model when the investors use general investment
strategies. Moreover, it is assumed that the states of the world are homogenous
discrete-time Markov process. The main result is given by the following theorem
in [2].
Theorem 4.5.
Investor 1 using the strategy λ∗t,k (st) is a single survivor in the market selection
process, and moreover, dominates the others exponentially, if and only if the fol-
lowing condition is fulfilled:
• There exists a random variable κ > 0 such that
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
#{t ∈ {0, . . . , T} : |λ∗ (st)− ξt
(
st
) | ≥ κ} > 0
with probability 1, where
ξt = (ξt,1, . . . , ξt,K) = f
(
rt, λ
2
t , . . . , λ
I
t
)
=
I∑
j=2
rjt
1− r1t
λjt .
Here, f is termed as the CAPM decision rule.
The Theorem 4.5 tells us the investor who follows the portfolio rule λ∗ eventually
accumulates the total market wealth. This portfolio rule λ∗ is asymptotically
distinct from CAPM rule. When the investor uses the CAPM rule then the relative
market wealth remains constant. Hence he/she neither dominates nor gets extinct
from out of the market.
4.2.1.2 Asset Market Games of Survival
Recently, in [4] by using general, adaptive portfolio rules Amir et. al. studied
that the investor who employs the identified portfolio rules survives in the market.
These strategies depend on observed history of the game and the exogenous states
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of the world. Furthermore, it is indicated that this kind of strategy is essentially
unique. The following theorems are proved in [4].
Theorem 4.6.
The portfolio rule Λ∗ = (λ∗t ) is a survival strategy.
Theorem 4.6 means that the relative market share is positive, bounded away from
zero over an infinite time horizon.
Theorem 4.7.
If Λ = (λt) is a basic survival strategy; i.e., the investment strategy depends only
on the history st of the process of states of the world, and does not depend on the
market history, then
∞∑
t=1
‖λ∗t − λt‖2 <∞ a.s.,
where ‖.‖ is the Euclidean norm in a finite-dimensional space.
The above theorem shows us the strategy λ∗t is essentially unique, i.e., any other
this type of strategy is asymptotically similar to the λ∗t .
4.2.2 Constant Investment Strategies
In this section, it is supposed that there are no redundant assets, i.e. the relative
payoffs of the assets R1 (s) , . . . , RK (s) are linearly independent and the states of
the world are independent, identically distributed.
4.2.2.1 Evolutionary Stability
In [26], Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ studied the evolution of market shares of portfolio
rules with short-lived assets. The market is incomplete and the prices are given
endogenously. They found necessary and sufficient conditions for the evolutionary
stability of portfolio rules. The random dynamical system theory was used during
the analysis. The main results in this paper are given by the following theorems.
Theorem 4.8.
Let the state of nature be determined by an ergodic process. Suppose investors
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only employ simple strategies, i.e., λ (w) ≡ λ ∈ ∆K. Then the simple strategy λ∗
defined by,
λ∗k = ERk (w)
for k = 1, . . . , K is evolutionarily stable, and no other strategy is locally evolution-
arily stable.
Theorem 4.9.
Let the state of nature be determined by an i.i.d. process. Then λ∗k = ERk,
k = 1, . . . , K, is the only evolutionarily stable portfolio rule. Moreover, if S is
the power set of the set of states S, then we find that all other completely mixed
adapted strategies are not even locally evolutionarily stable.
The technical assumption that S is the power set of the set of states S is fulfilled.
For example, if S is countable (or finite) and S is the Borel σ-field. This condition
is necessary to guarantee measurability of a strategy.
Theorem 4.10.
Let the state of nature be determined by a Markov process (with transition proba-
bility P ). Then the adaptive strategy λ∗ defined by
λ∗k (w0) = E (Rk (w1) |w0) =
∫
S
Rk (s)P (ds, w0) ,
for k = 1, . . . , K is the only evolutionarily stable portfolio rule. Moreover, if S is
the power set of the set of states S, then we find that all other completely mixed
adapted strategies are not even locally evolutionarily stable.
The above three theorems tell us the local stability conditions conduct a simple
portfolio rule in the case of ergodic, i.i.d., and Markov process, respectively. This
portfolio rule is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy.
4.2.2.2 Domination
In [21], Evstigneev et. al. studied the model in Section 4.1 when the investors use
simple investment strategies in an incomplete market; i.e., the number of securities
is less than the number of states. The prices are endogenous. The following
theorem which is proved in [21] tells us there is a unique survival investment
strategy that accumulates the total market wealth.
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Theorem 4.11.
Let investor i use the strategy λi = λ∗, while all the other investors j 6= i use
strategies λj 6= λ∗. Then investor i is the single survivor.
From Definition 4.2 - (3), we say that the investor is a single survivor if the market
share of this investor tends to 1 a.s.
4.2.2.3 Investors With Partial Information on Probability p
In the model used in [8] with short-lived assets, the investors use constant (simple)
investment strategies. The Kelly rule requires the full knowledge of the probability
distribution from the investor which is more difficult. In [8], Bahsoun et. al. used
an IFS representation of (4.8) and Proposition 3.5 and found another successful
strategy which does not require full knowledge of the probability distribution.
Theorem 4.12.
If for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K} λ1k lies between ERk and λ2k, then investor 1 cannot be
driven out of the market; i.e., he/she either dominates or at least survives.
In Theorem 4.12, λ1k and λ
2
k are investment strategies of investor 1 and investor 2,
respectively. It means that by using Proposition 3.5 a rule is provided with partial
information on p for investors. As long as the investor employs this rule he/she
either dominates or at least survives in the market. More details can be found in
[8].
4.3 Betting Games and The Probabilities of Suc-
cess
This section is one of our main results [10]. We will apply our ideas (Proposition
3.10 and Proposition 3.11) in Section 3.2 to study the wealth dynamics of investors,
where the states of the world are not identically distributed. In particular, they will
depend on the amount of money invested in the assets. To simplify this idea, let us
first reconsider the Kelly model [29] in a more realistic setting. In particular, let us
consider a horse race model where the odds of the outcomes of the events depend
on the amount wagered on them. For example, in the case of a horse race between
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two horses, say black and white, this means that the probability that black wins is
a function of the amount bet on black. Such a setting is common in real-life betting
games. We will investigate this situation in a more general setting. In particular
in the financial model of [21] introduced in Section 4.1 when the probabilities of
success of assets depend on the amount invested in them. Investors are allowed
to use simple investment strategies and states of the world are not identically
distributed. Our main result is showed by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.13.
Suppose that investor 1 uses the strategy λk =
∑L
s=1 ps (0)Rk (s). If investor 2
uses a different strategy; i.e., λ¯ 6= λ, then investor 1 will survive.
Proof.
First find τ
′
s (0) for any s. We get
τ
′
s (0) =
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λk
λ¯k
,
where λk is the strategy of investor 1 and λ¯k is the strategy of investor 2. Using
Proposition 3.10, we find that the first Lyapunov exponent at 0.
l1 (0, w) ≥
L∑
s=1
ps (0) ln |τ
′
s (0) |
=
L∑
s=1
ps (0) ln
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λk
λ¯k
.
By Jensen’s inequality,
≥
L∑
s=1
ps (0)
K∑
k=1
Rk (s) ln
λk
λ¯k
=
K∑
k=1
(
L∑
s=1
ps (0)Rk (s)
)
ln
λk
λ¯k
=
K∑
k=1
λk ln
λk
λ¯k
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.38. Since the Lyapunov expo-
nent of l1 (0, w) > 0 at 0 for all w, we conclude that nearby orbits of the skew
product map representing the random map of the market cannot converge to zero.
Consequently investor 1 survives.
Chapter 5
An Evolutionary Market Model
With Long-lived Assets
We first recall the model of [3].
5.1 The Model
We consider a market where K ≥ 2 long-lived assets. The market is influenced by
random factors modeled in terms of independent, identically distributed random
elements s1, s2, . . . in a finite space S. At each date t = 1, 2, . . . assets k =
1, 2, . . . , K pay dividends Dk (st) ≥ 0 depending on the “state of the world” st at
date t. The functions Dk (st) are measurable and satisfy
K∑
k=1
Dk (s) > 0 for all s.
This condition means that in each random situation at least one asset yields a
strictly positive dividend. The total volume (the number of units) of asset k
traded in the market at date t is Vt,k = Vt,k (s
t) > 0, where st := (s1, . . . , st) is
the history of the process (st) from time 1 to time t. For t = 0, Vt,k is a constant
number, and for t ≥ 1, Vt,k (st) is a measurable function of st.
We denote by pt ∈ RK+ the vector of market prices of the assets. For each k =
1, . . . , K, the coordinate pt,k of pt = (pt,1, . . . , pt,K) stands for the price of one
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unit of asset k at date t. There are I ≥ 2 investors (traders) acting in the
market. A portfolio of investor i at date t = 0, 1, . . . is specified by a vector
xit =
(
xit,1, . . . , x
i
t,K
) ∈ RK+ where xit,k is the amount (the number of units) of asset
k in the portfolio xit. The scalar product 〈pt, xit〉 =
∑K
k=1 pt,kx
i
t,k expresses the
value of the investor i’s portfolio xit at date t in terms of the prices pt,k. At date
t = 0, the investors have initial endowments wi0 > 0 (i = 1, 2, . . . , I) that form
their budgets at date 0. Investor i’s wealth (budget) at date t ≥ 1 is
wit := 〈Dt + pt, xit−1〉, (5.1)
where
Dt := D (st) := (D1 (st) , . . . , DK (st)) .
It consists of two components: the dividends 〈Dt, xit−1〉 paid by the portfolio xit−1
and the market value 〈pt, xit−1〉 of the portfolio xit−1 expressed in terms of the
today’s prices pt. A fraction µt = µt (s
t−1) of the budget is invested into assets.
We suppose that the investment rate 0 < µit (s
t−1) < 1 is the same for all the
investors, although it may depend on time and random factors. We assume that
µt is predictable: it depends on the history s
t−1 of the process (st) up to time
t−1 (not t). The number 1−µt represents the consumption rate. The assumption
that 1−µt is essential since we focus in this work on the analysis of the long-term
performance of trading strategies. Without this assumption, an analysis of this
kind does not make sense: a seemingly worse performance of a portfolio rule in
the long run might be simply due to a higher consumption rate of the investor
[3]. We shall suppose that the function µt (s
t−1) is measurable (for t = 0, 1 it is
constant) and satisfies the following condition:
µt
(
st−1
)
< Vt,k
(
st
)
/Vt−1,k
(
st−1
)
. (5.2)
This condition holds, in particular, when the total mass Vt,k (s
t) of each asset k
does not decrease, i.e., when the right-hand side of (5.2) is not less than one. But
(5.2) does not exclude the situation when Vt,k decreases at some rate, not faster
than µt.
An investment strategy (portfolio rule) of investor i = 1, 2, . . . , I is specified by a
vector of investment proportions λit =
(
λit,1, . . . , λ
i
t,K
)
according to which he/she
plans to distribute the available budget between assets at each date t. Vectors λit
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belong to the unit simplex
∆K := {(a1, . . . , aK) ≥ 0 : a1 + . . .+ aK = 1}.
In this model it is assumed that the market clears (asset supply is equal to asset
demand), which makes it possible to determine the equilibrium price pt,k of each
asset k from the equations
pt,kVt,k = µt
I∑
i=1
λit,kw
i
t, k = 1, . . . , K. (5.3)
On the left-hand side of (5.3) we have the total value pt,kVt,k of all the assets of the
type k in the market (recall that the amount of each asset k at date t is Vt,k). The
right-hand side represents the total wealth invested in asset k by all the investors.
Equilibrium implies the equality in (5.3). The investment proportions λi1, . . . , λ
i
K
chosen by the investors determine their portfolios xit =
(
xit,1, . . . , x
i
t,K
)
at date t
by the formula
xit,k =
µtλ
i
t,kw
i
t
pt,k
, k = 1, . . . , K, i = 1, . . . , I. (5.4)
Note that for t ≥ 1, the price vector pt is determined implicitly as the solution to
the system of equations (5.3), which can be written
pt,kVt,k = µt
I∑
i=1
λik,t〈Dt + pt, xit−1〉, k = 1, . . . , K. (5.5)
Given a strategy profile
(
λ1t , . . . , λ
I
t
)
of investors and their initial endowments
w10, . . . , w
I
0, we can generate a path(
pt;x
1
t , . . . , x
I
t
)
, (5.6)
of market dynamics, by defining the price vectors pt = pt (s
t) and the portfolios
xit = x
i
t (s
t) recursively according to equations (5.3) - (5.4). Equations (5.4) make
sense only if pt,k > 0, or equivalently, if the aggregate demand for each asset (under
the equilibrium prices) is strictly positive. Those strategy profiles
(
λ1t , . . . , λ
I
t
)
which guarantee that the recursive procedure described above leads at each step
to strictly positive equilibrium prices will be called admissible. In what follows,
we will deal only with such strategy profiles. The hypothesis of admissibility
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guarantees that the random dynamical system under consideration is well-defined.
Under this hypothesis, we obtain by induction that on the equilibrium path, all
the portfolios xit =
(
xit,1, . . . , x
i
t,K
)
are non-zero and the wealth wit = 〈Dt+pt, xit−1〉
of each investor is strictly positive. Further, by summing up equations (5.4) over
i = 1, . . . , I, we find that
I∑
i=1
xit,k =
∑I
i=1 µtλ
i
t,kw
i
t
pt,k
=
pt,kVt,k
pt,k
= Vt,k (5.7)
(the market clears) for every asset k and each date t ≥ 1. Thus for every equi-
librium state of the market
(
pt, x
1
t , . . . , x
I
t
)
, we have pt > 0, x
i
t 6= 0 and (5.7).
Assume that the total mass Vt,k of each asset k grows (or decreases) at the same
rate γt = γt (s
t−1) > 0:
Vt,k/Vt−1,k = γt (t ≥ 1). (5.8)
Thus
Vt,k
(
st−1
)
= γt
(
st−1
)
. . . γ2
(
s1
)
γ1Vk, (5.9)
where Vk > 0 (k = 1, 2, . . . , K) are the initial amounts of the assets. The growth
rate process γt (like the investment rate process µt) is predictable: γt depends
only on the history st−1 of the states of the world up to time t − 1. In the case
of dividend-paying assets involving investments in the real economy, assumption
(5.8) means that the economic system under consideration is on a balanced growth
path. Define the relative dividends of the assets k = 1, . . . , K by
Rk (st) =
Dk (st)Vk∑K
m=1Dm (st)Vm
. (5.10)
It follows from (5.8) that
Rt,k =
Dt,kVt−1,k∑K
m=1 Dt,mVt−1,m
,
where Rt,k = Rk (st) and Dt,k = Dk (st).
Define
λ∗k := ERk (st) , k = 1, . . . , K, (5.11)
and put
λ∗ = (λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
K) ,
Chapter 5. An Evolutionary Market Model With Long-lived Assets 59
where E (.) is the expectation with respect to the underlying probability on P . The
portfolio rule λ∗ is called the Kelly rule. The portfolio rule specified by (5.11)
prescribes to distribute wealth across assets in accordance with the proportions of
the expected relative dividends (which do not depend on t because the random
elements st are i.i.d.). Assume that the following conditions hold:
(A1) For each k, the expectation ERk (st) is strictly positive.
(A2) The functions R1 (s) , . . . , RK (s) are linearly independent with respect to
the probability distribution of st, i.e., the equality
∑
βkRk (st) = 0 holding
a.s. for some constants βk implies that β1 = . . . = βK = 0.
(A3) There exist constants 0 < σ
′
< σ
′′
< 1 such that the process
σt
(
st−1
)
:= µt
(
st−1
)
/γt
(
st−1
)
satisfies σ
′ ≤ σt (st−1) ≤ σ′′ .
Condition (A1) implies that the vector λ∗ has strictly positive coordinates. Hy-
pothesis (A2) can be interpreted as the absence of redundant assets. Condition
(A3) states that the discount factor σt cannot be too close to 0 and 1.
The market share of investor i is defined by
rit :=
wit
Wt
,
where Wt :=
∑I
i=1w
i
t is the total market wealth. Consider the path (5.6) of the
random dynamical system generated by
(
λ1t , . . . , λ
I
t
)
and the sequence of vectors
rt =
(
r1t , . . . , r
I
t
)
of the market shares of the investors at date t. The following
proposition is proved in [3]. We include its proof for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 5.1.
The following equations hold:
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
[ρt+1〈λt+1,k, rt+1〉+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k]
λit,kr
i
t
〈λt,k, rt〉 , i = 1, . . . , I, t ≥ 0.
(5.12)
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Proof.
From (5.3) and (5.4) we get
pt,k = V
−1
t,k µt
I∑
i=1
λit,k〈pt +Dt, xit−1〉 =
µtV
−1
t,k
I∑
i=1
λit,kw
i
t = µtV
−1
t,k 〈λt,k, wt〉, (5.13)
xit,k =
Vt,kλ
i
t,kw
i
t
〈λt,k, wt〉 , (5.14)
where t ≥ 1, wt :=
(
w1t , . . . , w
I
t
)
and λt,k :=
(
λ1t,k, . . . , λ
I
t,k
)
. The analogous formu-
las for t = 0,
p0,k = µ0V
−1
0,k 〈λ0,k, w0〉, xi0,k =
V0,kλ
i
0,kw
i
0
〈λ0,k, w0〉 . (5.15)
Consequently, we have
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
(pt+1,k +Dt+1,k)x
i
t,k =
K∑
k=1
(
µt+1
〈λt+1,k, wt+1〉
Vt+1,k
+Dt+1,k
)
Vt,kλ
i
t,kw
i
t
〈λt,k, wt〉 =
K∑
k=1
(
µt+1
〈λt+1,k, wt+1〉Vt,k
Vt+1,k
+Dt+1,kVt,k
)
λit,kw
i
t
〈λt,k, wt〉 , t ≥ 0. (5.16)
By summing up these equations over i = 1, . . . , I, we obtain
Wt+1 =
K∑
k=1
(
µt+1
〈λt+1,k, wt+1〉Vt,k
Vt+1,k
+Dt+1,kVt,k
)∑I
i=1 λ
i
t,kw
i
t
〈λt,k, wt〉 =
K∑
k=1
(
µt+1
〈λt+1,k, wt+1〉Vt,k
Vt+1,k
+Dt+1,kVt,k
)
.
As long as
Vt+1,k/Vt,k = γt+1 > 0 (5.17)
Chapter 5. An Evolutionary Market Model With Long-lived Assets 61
(see (5.8)), we have
Wt+1 =
K∑
k=1
(
µt+1γ
−1
t+1〈λt+1,k, wt+1〉+Dt+1,kVt,k
)
=
K∑
k=1
(
µt+1γ
−1
t+1〈λt+1,k, wt+1〉
)
+
K∑
k=1
Dt+1,kVt,k
= µt+1γ
−1
t+1
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
λit+1,kw
i
t+1 +
K∑
k=1
Dt+1,kVt,k
= µt+1γ
−1
t+1
I∑
i=1
(
K∑
k=1
λit+1,k
)
wit+1 +
K∑
k=1
Dt+1,kVt,k
= µt+1γ
−1
t+1
I∑
i=1
wit+1 +
K∑
k=1
Dt+1,kVt,k
= µt+1γ
−1
t+1Wt+1 +
K∑
k=1
Dt+1,kVt,k.
This implies the formula
Wt+1 =
1
1− µt+1γ−1t+1
K∑
m=1
Dt+1,mVt,m, (5.18)
where µt+1γ
−1
t+1 := ρt+1. From (5.16) and (5.17), we find
wit+1 =
K∑
k=1
(ρt+1〈λt+1,k, wt+1〉+Dt+1,kVt,k)
λit,kw
i
t
〈λt,k, wt〉 , t ≥ 0.
Dividing both sides of this equation by Wt+1 and using (5.18), we get
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
[
ρt+1〈λt+1,k, rt+1〉+ (1− ρt+1) Dt+1,kVt,k∑K
m=1Dt+1,mVt,m
]
λit,kw
i
t/Wt
〈λt,k, wt〉/Wt ,
which yields (5.12) by virtue of (5.8) and (5.10).
5.1.1 Notions in Evolutionary Finance
Definition 5.2.
In the theory of evolutionary finance there are three possibilities for investor i :
1. Extinction; i.e., limt→∞ rit = 0 a.s.
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2. Survival; i.e., lim supt→∞ r
i
t > 0 a.s. but lim inft→∞ r
i
t < 1 a.s.
3. Domination; i.e., limt→∞ rit = 1 a.s.
Definition 5.3.
A portfolio rule λi is called evolutionarily stable, if for every portfolio rule λj 6= λi
there is a random variable  > 0 such that limt→∞ ϕi (t, ω, r) = 1 for all ri ≥
1−  (ω) almost surely.
Definition 5.4.
A portfolio rule λi is called locally evolutionarily stable, if there exists a random
variable δ (ω) > 0 such that λi is evolutionarily stable for all portfolio rules λj 6= λi
with ‖λi (ω)− λj (ω) ‖ < δ (ω) for all ω.
5.2 Literature Review
In this section we review some recent results from evolutionary finance. We first
start with the general case where all investors use dynamic strategies.
5.2.1 Dynamic Investment Strategies
Amir et al. [3] studied the above model when general, adaptive portfolio rules are
used by the investors. The following theorem is proved in [3]. It shows that the
Kelly rule λ∗ survives; i.e., keeps relative wealth bounded away from zero a.s., but
it does not necessarily dominate the market.
Theorem 5.5.
The portfolio rule λ∗ is a survival strategy.
Theorem 5.5 means that the investor using λ∗ cannot be driven out of the market.
5.2.2 Constant Investment Strategies
In this section we first assume: All investors use constant strategies: for all i =
1, 2, ..., I and t ≥ 0
λit := λ
i = (λi1, ..., λ
i
K).
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Strategies of this kind are called fixed-mix, or constant proportions, portfolio rules:
they prescribe to select investment proportions at time 0 and keep them fixed over
the whole infinite time horizon. Thus the random dynamical system (5.12) reduces
to
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
[ρt+1〈λk, rt+1〉+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k] λ
i
kr
i
t
〈λk, rt〉 , (5.19)
i = 1, ..., I, t ≥ 0.
5.2.2.1 The game theoretic setting
In [7] the model of Section 5.1 was studied from a game theoretic point of view.
Given a strategy profile (λ1, ..., λI), the performance of a strategy λi used by
investor i will be characterised by the following random variable
ξi := lim supt→∞
1
t
ln
wit∑
j 6=iw
j
t
. (5.20)
The expression wit/
∑
j 6=iw
j
t is the relative wealth of player/investor i and the
group {j : j 6= i} of i’s rivals. The random variable ξi = ξi(s∞;λ1, ..., λI) depends
on the strategy profile (λ1, ..., λI) and on the whole history s∞ := (s1, s2, ...) of
states of the world from time 1 to ∞. In the game under consideration, ξi plays
the role of the (random) payoff function of player i.
We shall say that a strategy λ¯ forms a symmetric Nash equilibrium almost surely
(a.s.) if
ξi(s∞; λ¯, ..., λ¯) ≥ ξi(s∞; λ¯, ..., λ, ..., λ¯) (a.s.) (5.21)
for every i, each strategy λ of investor i and each set of initial endowments w10 >
0, ..., wI0 > 0. The Nash equilibrium is called strict if the inequality in (5.21) is
strict.
The following theorem is proved in [7]:
Theorem 5.6.
The portfolio rule λ∗ is a unique strategy forming a symmetric Nash equilibrium
a.s. This equilibrium is strict.
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In game theory, Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a game. There are
at least two investors in the game. It is assumed that each investor knows the
equilibrium strategies of the other investors. And also, if the investor changes
his/her strategy while the other investors keep their strategies same then, this
investor does not gain anything.
5.2.2.2 Domination
In an earlier work, Evstigneev et al. [23] proved that the Kelly rule dominates
when all investors use constant strategies. Namely they proved:
Theorem 5.7.
The investor who follows the Kelly rule λ∗ dominates the market.
5.2.3 Local and Global Stability
Results on the local and global stability (see definitions 5.3 and 5.4) of investment
strategies and the proof of the following main result for local and global stability
can be found in [22].
The market selection process is given by the following random dynamical system:
rt+1 =
λ0
Dt+1 (wt+1)
ft
(
wt+1, wt
)
, (5.22)
where
ft
(
wt+1, wt
)
=Id− [λit,k (wt)wit
λt,k (wt)wt
]
i,k
Λt+1
(
wt+1
)−1 [ K∑
k=1
Dkt+1
(
wt+1
) λit,k (wt)wit
λt,k (wt)wt
]
i
and Λt+1 (w
t+1)
T
=
(
λt+1,1 (w
t+1)
T
, . . . , λt+1,K (w
t+1)
T
)
∈ RI×K is the matrix of
portfolio rules. To analyse evolutionarily stability of a portfolio rule, one has
to consider the random dynamical system (5.22) with an incumbent (with mar-
ket share r1t ) and a mutant (with market share r
2
t = 1 − r1t ). The resulting
one-dimensional system governing the market selection process for two stationary
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portfolio rules is given by
r1t+1 =
λ0
δt+1
([
1−
K∑
k=1
λ2t+1,kx
2
t,k
]
K∑
k=1
dkt+1x
1
t,k +
[
K∑
k=1
λ2t+1,kx
1
t,k
]
K∑
k=1
dkt+1x
2
t,k
)
(5.23)
where λit,k = λ
i
k (w
t), dkt+1 = d
k (wt+1), and
δt+1 =
[
1−
K∑
k=1
λ1t+1,kx
1
t,k
][
1−
K∑
k=1
λ2t+1,kx
2
t,k
]
−
[
K∑
k=1
λ2t+1,kx
1
t,k
][
K∑
k=1
λ1t+1,kx
2
t,k
]
.
The portfolio of the incumbent and the mutant , respectively, are given by
x1t,k =
λ1t,kr
1
t
λ1t,kr
1
t+λ
2
t,k(1−r1t )
and x2t,k =
λ2t,k(1−r1t )
λ1t,kr
1
t+λ
2
t,k(1−r1t )
. Denote the right-hand side of
(5.23) by h (wt+1, r1t ). The variational equation vt+1 =
[
∂h (wt=1, r1t ) /∂r
1
t |r1t=1
]
vt
governs the stochastic dynamics of the linearisation of (5.23) at the fixed point
r1t ≡ 1. It is derived from the derivative of (5.23)’s right-hand side with respect
to r1t evaluated at r
1
t = 1. This derivative can be equated as
∂h (wt+1, r1t )
∂r1t
|r1t=1 =
K∑
k=1
(
λ1k
(
wt+1
)
+ λ0d
k (wt+1)
) λ2k (wt)
λ1k (w
t)
. (5.24)
From (5.24) it can be read off the exponential growth rate of portfolio rule λ2’s
market share in a small neighborhood of r1 = 1, i.e. the state in which portfolio
rule λ1 owns total market wealth. The following assumption is made on the process
that governs the state of nature and in turn determines the asset payoffs.
• The state of nature follows a Markov process with strictly positive transition
probabilities, i.e. piss¯ > 0 for all s, s¯ ∈ S.
The exponential growth rate of portfolio rule λ2’s wealth share in a small neigh-
borhood of r1 = 1 is given by the Lyapunov exponent of the above variational
equation. It is given by
gλ1
(
λ2
)
=
∫
SN
∑
s∈S
piw0s ln
[
K∑
k=1
(
λ1k
(
w0, s
)
+ λ0d
k (s)
) λ2k (w0)
λ1k (w0)
]
P
(
dw0
)
where P denotes the stationary probability measure on histories wt induced by the
Markov chain. The main result in [22] is given by the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.8.
Define the portfolio rule λ∗ by λ∗0 = λ0 and
λ∗ = λ0
∞∑
m=1
(1− λ0)m pimd, (5.25)
using the matrix notation λ∗ = (λ∗k (s))s,k and d =
(
dk (s)
)
s,k
.
Stability:
i) Suppose
[
λ∗k (s) + λ0d
k (s)
]
s,k
has full rank. Then for every portfolio rule
λ 6= λ∗, one has gλ∗ (λ) < 0. Thus λ∗ is evolutionarily stable.
ii) For every λ, one has gλ∗ (λ) ≤ 0. Thus λ∗ is never evolutionarily unstable.
Instability:
iii) For every λ 6= λ∗ there exist arbitrarily close portfolio rules µ 6= λ such that
gλ (µ) > 0. Thus every λ 6= λ∗ is locally evolutionarily unstable and, in
particular, evolutionarily unstable.
Theorem 5.8 means that the investors who employ the Kelly portfolio rule drive
the investor who does not employ the Kelly portfolio rule out of the market. This
is known as the property of evolutionarily stability of λ∗ in evolutionary finance.
For more details on the existing literature on evolutionary finance we refer to [22].
5.3 The Kelly Portfolio Rule Dominates
Amir et al. [3] studied the model in Section 5.1 when investors employ general,
adaptive portfolio rules. It was shown in [3] that the Kelly rule λ∗ survives; i.e.,
keeps relative wealth bounded away from zero a.s., but it does not necessarily
dominate the market. The result of [3] suggests a very interesting question: Sup-
pose that investors are allowed to use general adaptive portfolio rules, can the
Kelly rule dominate? Or, more precisely, under what conditions does the Kelly
dominate?
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Obviously, in general, without any restrictions, one cannot expect the Kelly rule
to dominate. To see this, we first describe a recursive method of constructing
strategies which allows the investor who follows this recursive method to have
constant relative wealth at all times. Consequently, if other investors employ the
Kelly rule, they will not be able to accumulate the total relative wealth of the
market; i.e., they will not be able to dominate. This will be shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.9.
If investor 1 uses the portfolio rule
λ1t,k =
∑I
j=2 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
1− r1t
, (5.26)
for all t = 0, 1, . . . , and all k = 1, . . . , K, then her/his relative wealth remains
constant at all times; i.e., for all t = 0, 1, . . . , r1t+1 = r
1
t .
Proof.
From (5.12) we have
r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
[
ρt+1
I∑
j=1
λjt+1,kr
j
t+1 + (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
]
λ1t,kr
1
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
. (5.27)
Observe that the portfolio rule (5.26) implies that
λ1t,k =
I∑
j=1
λjt,kr
j
t . (5.28)
Therefore, from (5.27) and (5.28), we obtain
K∑
k=1
[
ρt+1
I∑
j=1
λjt+1,kr
j
t+1 + (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
]
=
r1t+1
r1t
. (5.29)
The left hand side of the above equation (5.29) is equal to 1. Indeed,
K∑
k=1
(
ρt+1
I∑
j=1
λjt+1,kr
j
t+1
)
+ 1− ρt+1 = 1.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
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The above observation gives us the following. If one of the investors 2, . . . , I uses
the portfolio rule λ∗, then he/she cannot be a single survivor, as long as investor
1 uses the decision rule (5.26). Consequently, the relative market share of investor
1 remains constant.
Remark 5.10. The portfolio rule (5.26) has an economic interpretation. By (5.3)
and (5.4), the portfolio of investor 1 is given by
x1t,k =
µtλ
1
t,kw
1
t
pt,k
=
λ1t,kw
1
t · Vt,k∑I
i=1 λ
i
t,kw
i
t
. (5.30)
If investor 1 uses the portfolio rule (5.26), then by (5.28) and (5.30), we obtain
that
x1t,k = r
1
t · Vt,k.
Thus the vector x1t will be proportional to market portfolio; i.e. to the (V1, . . . , VK)
whose components indicate the amounts of assets k = 1, . . . , K traded in the mar-
ket. Following [2] we call such portfolios CAPM portfolios. This is due to the fact
that portfolios having this structure result from the mean-variance optimisation
in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
In the following section we will state sufficient conditions for the Kelly rule to dom-
inate the market even when other investors are allowed to use dynamic adaptive
strategies.
5.3.1 The main result.
Define
ξt = (ξt,1, . . . , ξt,K) = ft
(
rt, λ
2
t , . . . , λ
I
t
)
, (5.31)
where f is the decision rule (5.26); i.e., for all t = 1, 2, . . . ,
ξt(s
t) :=
∑I
j=2 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
1− r1t
.
Following [2] (see Remark 5.10 above) we call the portfolio rule in (5.31) CAPM
strategy. Our first main result in this chapter is given by the following theorem
[9].
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Theorem 5.11.
If investor 1 employs the Kelly strategy (5.11), then he/she dominates the market
exponentially fast provided the following conditions are satisfied:
(C1) E (ln ξt,k (s
t) |st−1) = ln ξt−1,k(st−1) a.s.,
(C2) There exists a strictly positive random variable κ > 0, such that, almost
surely,
|λ∗ − ξt(st)| ≥ κ (5.32)
for t large enough.
(C3) The coordinates λt,k (s
t) of the vectors λt (s
t) are bounded away from zero by
a strictly positive non-random constant % (that might depend on the strategy
λ, but not on k, t and st), i.e. infi,k,t,st λ
i
t,k (s
t) > % > 0.
The proof of Theorem 5.11 is in section 5.3.2.
Remark 5.12.
Assumption (C1) means that the CAPM strategy ξt(s
t) forms a martingale with
respect to the filtration generated by (st).
Remark 5.13.
Since ξt(s
t) is a convex combination of λ2t , . . . , λ
I
t , assumption (C2) is certainly
satisfied if there exist a random variable κ, and a T > 0, such that for t ≥ T ,
with probability one, the distance between the vector λ∗ and the convex hull of
the vectors λ2t , . . . , λ
I
t is at least κ.
5.3.2 Proofs
We start this section by proving two lemmas which are needed in the proof of
Theorem 5.11.
Lemma 5.14.
We have
1− r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
[
λ1t+1,kr
1
t+1 +
(
1− r1t+1
)
ξt+1,k
]
+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}×
ξt,k (1− r1t )
λ1t,kr
1
t + (1− r1t ) ξt,k
,
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and
r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
[
λ1t+1,kr
1
t+1 +
(
1− r1t+1
)
ξt+1,k
]
+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}×
λ1t,kr
1
t
λ1t,kr
1
t + (1− r1t ) ξt,k
.
Proof.
By using (5.12), we have
1− r1t+1
1− r1t
=
∑I
i=2 r
i
t+1
1− r1t
=
∑I
i=2
{∑K
k=1 [ρt+1〈λt+1,k, rt+1〉+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k]
λit,kr
i
t
〈λt,k,rt〉
}
1− r1t
=
∑I
i=2
{∑K
k=1
[
ρt+1
∑I
j=1 λ
j
t+1,kr
j
t+1 + (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
]
λit,kr
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
}
1− r1t
=
∑K
k=1
[
ρt+1
∑I
j=1 λ
j
t+1,kr
j
t+1 + (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
] ∑I
i=2 λ
i
t,kr
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
1− r1t
=
K∑
k=1
[ρt+1ψt+1,k + (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k] ξt,k
ψt,k
,
where
ψt,k =
I∑
j=1
λjt,kr
j
t = λ
1
t,kr
1
t +
(
1− r1t
) ∑Ii=2 λit,krit
1− r1t
= λ1t,kr
1
t + ξt,k
(
1− r1t
)
.
Therefore,
1− r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
[
λ1t+1,kr
1
t+1 +
(
1− r1t+1
)
ξt+1,k
]
+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}×
ξt,k (1− r1t )
λ1t,kr
1
t + (1− r1t ) ξt,k
,
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r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
[
λ1t+1,kr
1
t+1 +
(
1− r1t+1
)
ξt+1,k
]
+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}×
λ1t,kr
1
t
λ1t,kr
1
t + (1− r1t ) ξt,k
.
Lemma 5.15.
For t = 1, 2, . . . , let
Dt = ln
r1t
(
r1t−1
)−1
(1− r1t )
(
1− r1t−1
)−1 .
Dt are uniformly bounded random variables.
Proof.
We have
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
I∑
j=1
λjt+1,kr
j
t+1 + (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}
λit,kr
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
≥
K∑
k=1
(1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
λit,kr
i
t∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
≥ rit (1− ρt+1)
K∑
k=1
Rt+1,k
mink λ
i
t,k
1
= rit (1− ρt+1) min
k
λit,k.
By assumption (C3), inf λit,k ≥ %. Then, we have
% ≤ r
i
t+1
rit
.
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For the upper bound we have
rit+1
rit
=
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
I∑
j=1
λjt+1,kr
j
t+1 + (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}
λit,k∑I
j=1 λ
j
t,kr
j
t
≤
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
I∑
j=1
λjt+1,kr
j
t+1 + (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}
1
mink λit,k
=
{
K∑
k=1
(
ρt+1
I∑
j=1
λjt+1,kr
j
t+1
)
+ (1− ρt+1)
}
1
mink λit,k
=
1
mink λit,k
≤ %−1.
Therefore, % ≤ rit+1
rit
≤ %−1 and this implies, because 1 − r1t =
∑I
m=2 r
m
t , that the
random variables Dt are uniformly bounded.
Proof of Theorem 5.11.
By Lemma 5.14, it is sufficient to consider the case of two investors 1 and 2, using
the strategies λ∗ and ξ, and whose market relative shares are given by
r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
[
λ1t+1,kr
1
t+1 +
(
1− r1t+1
)
ξt+1,k
]
+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}×
λ1t,kr
1
t
λ1t,kr
1
t + (1− r1t ) ξt,k
,
(5.33)
1− r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
{
ρt+1
[
λ1t+1,kr
1
t+1 +
(
1− r1t+1
)
ξt+1,k
]
+ (1− ρt+1)Rt+1,k
}×
ξt,k (1− r1t )
λ1t,kr
1
t + (1− r1t ) ξt,k
.
(5.34)
We consider the ratio zt =
r1t
1−r1t of the market shares of investors 1 and 2. Then
the dynamics of zt are described by the following equation
zt = zt−1
∑K
k=1 [ρtξt,k + (1− ρt)Rt,k] λ
∗
k
λ∗kzt−1+ξt−1,k∑K
k=1 [ρtλ
∗
k + (1− ρt)Rt,k] ξt−1,kλ∗kzt−1+ξt−1,k
⇔
zt
zt−1
=
∑K
k=1 [ρtξt,k + (1− ρt)Rt,k] λ
∗
k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)∑K
k=1 [ρtλ
∗
k + (1− ρt)Rt,k] ξt−1,kλ∗kr1t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)
. (5.35)
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The derivation of equation (5.35) can be found in Appendix A.2.
To prove the theorem, our goal is to show that, with probability 1,
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
ln
r1T
1− r1T
> 0. (5.36)
For this purpose, we define for t = 1, 2, . . .
Dt := ln
r1t
(
r1t−1
)−1
(1− r1t )
(
1− r1t−1
)−1 = ln ztzt−1 . (5.37)
Observe that
D1 +D2 + . . .+DT = ln
r1T
1− r1T
− ln r
1
0
1− r10
. (5.38)
Hence, (5.36) holds if and only if
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
(D1 +D2 + . . .+DT ) > 0 a.s. (5.39)
We have the following identity:
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt =
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) + 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
Dt − E(Dt|st−1)
)
.
Let Gt := Dt−E(Dt|st−1). By Lemma 5.15, the random variables Dt are uniformly
bounded. Therefore, by the law of large numbers, ( see Theorem 2.47 proved in
[25] ), we have
1
T
(G1 + . . .+GT )→ 0
with probability 1. It follows that
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1). (5.40)
Therefore, (5.36) is equivalent to
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) > 0 a.s. (5.41)
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By using (5.35), we have
E(Dt|st−1) = E
[
ln
zt
zt−1
|st−1
]
=
E
ln
∑K
k=1 [ρtξt,k (st) + (1− ρt)Rt,k] λ
∗
k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)∑K
k=1 [ρtλ
∗
k + (1− ρt)Rt,k] ξt−1,kλ∗kr1t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)
|st−1
 . (5.42)
We will show that (5.42) is bounded away from zero. When we apply Jensen’s
inequality for conditional expectations ( see properties of conditional expectation
8 ) to equation (5.42), we obtain
E
(
ln
K∑
k=1
[ρtξt,k + (1− ρt)Rt,k] λ
∗
k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
− E
(
ln
K∑
k=1
[ρtλ
∗
k + (1− ρt)Rt,k]
ξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
≥ ρtE
(
ln
K∑
k=1
ξt,k
λ∗k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
+ (1− ρt)E
(
ln
K∑
k=1
Rt,k
λ∗k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
− E
(
ln
K∑
k=1
[ρtλ
∗
k + (1− ρt)Rt,k]
ξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
= ρtE
(
ln
K∑
k=1
ξt,k
λ∗k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
+ (1− ρt)E
(
ln
K∑
k=1
Rt,k
λ∗k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
− ρtE
(
ln
K∑
k=1
[ρtλ
∗
k + (1− ρt)Rt,k]
ξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
− (1− ρt)E
(
ln
K∑
k=1
[ρtλ
∗
k + (1− ρt)Rt,k]
ξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
:= ρtA + (1− ρt)B,
where
A := E
ln
∑K
k=1 ξt,k
λ∗k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)∑K
k=1 R˜t,k
ξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)
|st−1
 ,
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B := E
ln
∑K
k=1 Rt,k
λ∗k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)∑K
k=1 R˜t,k
ξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)
|st−1
 ,
and
R˜t,k := ρtλ
∗
k + (1− ρt)Rt,k.
Therefore, to show that (5.42) is bounded away from zero, it is enough to show
that A ≥ 0 and B is bounded away from zero. For A, noticing that E(R˜t,k|st−1) =
λ∗k, and using Jensen’s inequality for conditional expectations ( see properties of
conditional expectation 8 ), we obtain
A = E
(
ln
K∑
k=1
ξt,k
λ∗k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
) |st−1)
− ln
K∑
k=1
ξt−1,k
λ∗k
λ∗kr
1
t−1 + ξt−1,k
(
1− r1t−1
)
= E
ln
∑K
k=1
ξt,k
ξt−1,k
λ∗kξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)∑K
k=1
λ∗kξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)
|st−1
 .
(5.43)
Define ak :=
λ∗kξt−1,k
λ∗kr
1
t−1+ξt−1,k(1−r1t−1)
. Notice that ak > 0 and that ak is measurable
with respect to information generated by st−1. Then, by applying the finite form
of Jensen’s inequality for concave functions ( see Proposition 2.35 ) to the right
hand side of (5.43) we obtain
A = E
ln ∑Kk=1 ak ξt,kξt−1,k∑K
k=1 ak
|st−1
 ≥ E
∑Kk=1 ak ln ξt,kξt−1,k∑K
k=1 ak
|st−1

=
1∑K
k=1 ak
E
(
K∑
k=1
ak ln
ξt,k
ξt−1,k
|st−1
)
(5.44)
=
∑K
k=1 akE [ln ξt,k − ln ξt−1,k| st−1]∑K
k=1 ak
= 0,
by using condition (C1). For B, by Lemma A.2 (see Appendix A.3), we have
B ≥ δ%(|λ∗ − ξt−1(st−1)|), (5.45)
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where % is the strictly positive constant bounding away from zero the coordinates
of λit. Therefore, by (5.44) and (5.45) we obtain
E(Dt|st−1) ≥ δ%
(|λ∗ − ξt−1 (st−1) |) . (5.46)
Consequently,
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Dt|st−1) ≥ lim inf
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
δ%
(|λ∗ − ξt−1 (st−1) |) ≥ δ%(κ) > 0.
The last inequality follows from our assumption (5.32). Therefore, we obtained
(5.41) which implies (5.36); i.e.,
lim inf
T→∞
1
T
ln
r1T
1− r1T
> 0 a.s.
Consequently, for large T , there exists a strictly positive random variable η such
that
r1T
1− r1T
> eηT .
Thus, investor one dominates the market and its relative wealth converges to 1
exponentially fast.
5.4 Absence of Correct Beliefs
In Section 5.4, we use Proposition 3.5 to show that the investor who is closer to
the Kelly rule cannot be driven out of the market (see Theorem 5.17). We have
the relative wealth of the investors given by
rit+1 =
K∑
k=1
[ρ〈λk, rt+1〉+ (1− ρ)Rk (st+1)] λ
i
kr
i
t
〈λk, rt〉 , i = 1, · · · , I. (5.47)
Here, we only consider the case when I = 2. From equation (5.47), we obtain
rt+1 =
K∑
k=1
{
ρ
[
λk(1− rt+1) + λkrt+1
]
+(1−ρ)Rk(st+1)
} λkrt
λk(1− rt) + λkrt
, (5.48)
where λ = (λk)
K
k=1 is the strategy of investor 1 whose relative wealth is rt+1 and
λ = (λk)
K
k=1 is the strategy of investor 2 whose relative wealth is 1 − rt+1. Now
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from equation (5.48), we obtain
rt+1
(
1−
K∑
k=1
ρ(λk − λk) λkrt
λk(1− rt) + λkrt
)
=
K∑
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk(st+1)
) λkrt
λk(1− rt) + λkrt
. (5.49)
Note that R.H.S. of the equation (5.49) is positive for all t. Then, L.H.S. of this
equation is positive for all t. Since rt+1 > 0 for all t, we have
1−
K∑
k=1
ρ(λk − λk) λkrt
λk(1− rt) + λkrt
> 0. (5.50)
Therefore, we can divide both sides of the equation (5.49) by (5.50) and we obtain
rt+1 =
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk(st+1)
)
λkrt
λk(1−rt)+λkrt
1−∑Kk=1 ρ(λk − λk) λkrtλk(1−rt)+λkrt . (5.51)
In conclusion, the above random dynamical system (5.51) can be represented by
the random map
F = {τs,ps}s∈S (5.52)
where
τs (r) =
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk (s)
)
λkr
λk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr :=
A
B
, (5.53)
and p = (ps) is the distribution on S. We now state our main result. From now
on, we impose the following condition.
Assumption 5.16.
We assume that for k ∈ {1, . . . , K}{
either λk ≤ λk ≤ λ∗k,
or λ∗k ≤ λk ≤ λk.
(5.54)
Assumption 5.16 means that the investment strategy of investor 1 is closer (coor-
dinatewise) than that of investor 2 to the Kelly rule. Our second main result in
this chapter is given by the following theorem [11].
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Theorem 5.17.
Let I = 2. Under assumption (5.16) investor 1 cannot be driven out of the market.
He/she will either dominate or at least survive.
5.4.1 Proofs
To analyse the performance of investment strategies in the absence of “correct be-
liefs”, i.e., in the absence of an investor using the Kelly rule, we invoke the theory
of random dynamical systems ( see Section 3 for definition of RDS). In this section
we define the notion of a random dynamical system (RDS) and state some results
from [8]. Our ideas are inspired by [8], where techniques from RDS were applied
to the model of short-lived assets of Evstigneev et al. [21].
We verify that the evolution of the relative market wealth (5.12) can be represented
by a random map whose constituent maps satisfy the assumptions of [8]. We refer
the reader to sections 3.1, 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of Chapter 3.
Lemma 5.18.
1. τs (0) = 0, τs (1) = 1.
2. τs is an increasing function which maps [0, 1] into itself.
3. τs is a continuous function on [0, 1], moreover it is differentiable.
Proof.
1. τs (0) = 0 is obvious.
τs (1) =
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk (s)
)
λk
λk
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk) λkλk
=
ρ
∑K
k=1 λk + (1− ρ)
∑K
k=1Rk (s)
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk)
=
ρ+ 1− ρ
1
= 1.
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2. Let gs (r) =
τs (r)
1− τs (r) . Note that gs (r) is increasing⇐⇒ τs (r) is increasing.
Thus, it is enough to show that gs (r) is increasing.
gs (r) =
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk (s)
)
λkr
λk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr
× 1
1−
∑K
k=1(ρλk+(1−ρ)Rk(s))
λkr
λk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 ρ(λk−λk) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr
=
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk (s)
)
λkr
λk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 (ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk (s)) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr
=
fs
hs
.
Observe that
fs (r) =
K∑
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk (s)
) λkr
λk (1− r) + λkr
=
K∑
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk (s)
) λk
λk
(1−r)
r
+ λk
increases as r increases. Moreover,
hs (r) = 1−
K∑
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk (s)
) λkr
λk (1− r) + λkr
.
Since
(
ρλk+(1− ρ)Rk (s)
)
λkr
λk(1−r)+λkr increases, hs (r) decreases. Therefore,
gs (r) increases.
3. The proof of (3) is standard but long. Therefore, we have added it as an
appendix at the end of the paper.
Lemma 5.19.
Let
τ (r) =
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk
)
λkr
λk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr , r ∈ [0, 1] ,
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and
τ (r) = rβ(r).
Then, for any r ∈ [0, 1], ln (β (r)) is bounded.
Proof.
We have
τ (r) = rβ(r) = exp (ln (r) β (r)) .
Consequently,
β (r) =
ln (τr)
ln (r)
, for any 0 < r < 1 and 0 < τ (r) < 1.
Notice that for any 0 < r < 1 and 0 < τ (r) < 1, β (r) > 0. The minimum and
maximum of β (r) can be attained at r = 0, r = 1 or at a point of local extremum.
We apply De L’Hospital rule to find the limr→0+ β (r) and limr→1− β (r).
lim
r→0+
ln (τr)
ln (r)
= lim
r→0+
{∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk
)
λkλk
{λk(1−r)+λkr}2
}
B
AB
r
+
{∑K
k=1 ρ
(
λk − λk
)
λkλk
{λk(1−r)+λkr}2
}
A
AB
r
=
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk
)
λk
λk∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk
)
λk
λk
= 1.
lim
r→1−
ln (τr)
ln (r)
= lim
r→1−
{∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk
)
λkλk
{λk(1−r)+λkr}2
}
B
AB
r
+
{∑K
k=1 ρ
(
λk − λk
)
λkλk
{λk(1−r)+λkr}2
}
A
AB
r
=
∑K
k=1 (ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk) λkλk∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk
)
=
K∑
k=1
(ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk) λk
λk
.
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Lemma 5.20.
The function
G (r) =
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)λ∗k
)
λk
λk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr ≥ 1, (5.55)
for r ∈ [0, 1].
Proof.
G (r) ≥ 1
⇐⇒
K∑
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)λ∗k
) λk
λk (1− r) + λkr
≥
1−
K∑
k=1
ρ
(
λk − λk
) λkr
λk (1− r) + λkr
⇐⇒ H (r) := 1−
K∑
k=1
{
ρ
(
λk − λk
)
r + ρλk + (1− ρ)λ∗k
} λk
λk (1− r) + λkr
≤ 0.
Since H (1) = 0, it is enough to show that H (r) is increasing. We have
H
′
(r) =
K∑
k=1
(1− ρ)λ∗kλk
(
λk − λk
){
λk (1− r) + λkr
}2 . (5.56)
• For λk ≤ λk ≤ λ∗k, we have
λ∗kλk{
λk (1− r) + λkr
}2 ≥ λ∗kλk(
max{λk, λk}
)2
≥ λ
∗
kλk
(λk)
2 =
λ∗k
λk
≥ 1
λ∗kλk
(
λk − λk
){
λk (1− r) + λkr
}2 ≥ λk − λk. (5.57)
• For λ∗k ≤ λk ≤ λk, we have
λ∗kλk{
λk (1− r) + λkr
}2 ≤ λ∗kλk(
min{λk, λk}
)2
=
λ∗kλk
(λk)
2 ≤ 1
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λ∗kλk
(
λk − λk
){
λk (1− r) + λkr
}2 ≥ λk − λk. (5.58)
From (5.57) and (5.58), for all k, we have
λ∗kλk
(
λk − λk
){
λk (1− r) + λkr
}2 ≥ λk − λk.
Consequently,
K∑
k=1
(1− ρ)λ∗kλk
(
λk − λk
){
λk (1− r) + λkr
}2 ≥ 0.
So, the function H (r) is increasing and therefore, the function H (r) ≤ 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.17.
Let us consider the expression
L∑
s=1
ps ln (βs(r)) ≤ ln
(
L∑
s=1
psβs(r)
)
= ln
(
L∑
s=1
ps
ln(τs(r))
ln(r)
)
≤ ln
(
1
ln r
ln
(
L∑
s=1
psτs(r)
))
= ln
 1
ln r
ln
 L∑
s=1
ps
∑K
k=1
(
ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk(s)
)
λkr
λk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr
 (5.59)
= ln
 1
ln r
ln r + ln
∑Kk=1∑Ls=1 ps [ρλk + (1− ρ)Rk(s)] λkλk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr

= ln
 1
ln r
ln r + ln
∑Kk=1 [ρλk + (1− ρ)λ∗k] λkλk(1−r)+λkr
1−∑Kk=1 ρ (λk − λk) λkrλk(1−r)+λkr

= ln
(
1
ln r
(ln r + ln (G(r)))
)
= ln
(
1 +
1
ln r
ln (G (r))
)
≤ 0.
In the last inequality we used the fact that which was proved in Lemma 5.20
G (r) ≥ 1. Since the stochastic process st is an independent, identically distributed
process, we have, by (5.59),
E
(
lnαt | st−1
)
=
L∑
s=1
ps ln (βs (rt−2)) ≤ 0.
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Therefore, by Proposition 3.5, limt→∞ rt (st) 6= 0 a.s. This means that investor 1
either dominates or at least survives.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
We have studied survival and extinction problems in evolutionary finance. Firstly,
we have examined an evolutionary market model with short-lived assets. We pre-
sented our results when the states of the world are not identically distributed.
They may depend on the amount of money invested in the assets. We have com-
puted the Lyapunov exponents of the skew product associated with random market
system [10]. We used the Lyapunov exponents to study wealth dynamics of in-
vestors. We have found that the investor who employs a particular portfolio rule
cannot be driven out of the market [10]. Then, we analysed the market model with
long-lived assets. In [9], we have found sufficient conditions for an investor using
the Kelly rule to be a single survivor. Moreover, we showed that this investor dom-
inates the others exponentially fast. The investors were allowed to use dynamic
investment strategies. Finally, in [11], we analyse the long-lived asset model when
the exact probability distribution of the states of the world is not available for
investors. We have shown that in the absence of correct beliefs, the investor who
is closer to the Kelly rule may dominate the market or at least survive; i.e., this
investor cannot be driven out of the market. Our techniques are borrowed from
the theory of random dynamical systems.
Our results are based on many assumptions that can be extended in future re-
search. For instance, we showed the strategy that is closer to the Kelly rule
cannot be driven out of the market in case of two investors. One can extend this
result in case of I > 2 investors in the market. Moreover, we have assumed that
the investors use constant strategies. We would like to study this problem when
84
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the investors are allowed to use dynamic investment strategies. The solution of
this problem would be a remarkable result in the field.
Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1-(3).
To show that the function
τs (r) =
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,kr
λ∗t,kr + λ¯t,k (1− r)
is differentiable we need to show that the following limit
lim
h→0
{
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,k (a+ h)
λ∗t,k (a+ h) + λ¯t,k (1− a− h)
−
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,ka
λ∗t,ka+ λ¯t,k (1− a)
}
1
h
(A.1)
exists. From (A.1) we have
lim
h→0
{
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,k (a+ h)
[
λ∗t,ka+ λ¯t,k (1− a)
][
λ∗t,k (a+ h) + λ¯t,k (1− a− h)
] [
λ∗t,ka+ λ¯t,k (1− a)
]
−
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,ka
[
λ∗t,k (a+ h) + λ¯t,k (1− a− h)
][
λ∗t,k (a+ h) + λ¯t,k (1− a− h)
] [
λ∗t,ka+ λ¯t,k (1− a)
]} 1
h
= lim
h→0
{
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,kλ¯t,k (a+ h) (1− a)− λ∗t,kλ¯t,ka (1− a− h)[
λ∗t,k (a+ h) + λ¯t,k (1− a− h)
] [
λ∗t,ka+ λ¯t,k (1− a)
]} 1
h
= lim
h→0
{
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,kλ¯t,kh[
λ∗t,k (a+ h) + λ¯t,k (1− a− h)
] [
λ∗t,ka+ λ¯t,k (1− a)
]} 1
h
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= lim
h→0
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,kλ¯t,k[
λ∗t,k (a+ h) + λ¯t,k (1− a− h)
] [
λ∗t,ka+ λ¯t,k (1− a)
]
=
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗t,kλ¯t,k[
λ∗t,ka+ λ¯t,k (1− a)
]2
We showed that the limit exists. Therefore, the function τs (r) is differentiable.
A.2 Appendix
We make use the following proposition in Proof of Theorem 5.11. This proposition
can be found in [3].
Proposition A.1.
The process zt is governed by the following random dynamical system:
zt
zt−1
=
∑K
k=1
[
ρtλ
2
t,k + (1− ρt)Rt,k
] λ1t,k
λ1t,kzt−1+λ
2
t−1,k∑K
k=1
[
ρtλ1t,k + (1− ρt)Rt,k
] λ2t−1,k
λ1t−1,kzt+λ
2
t−1,k
. (A.2)
Proof. By using (5.12) with I = 2, we obtain
rit =
K∑
k=1
[
ρt
(
λit,kr
i
t + λ
j
t,k
(
1− rit
))
+ (1− ρt)Rt,k
] λit−1,krit−1
λit−1,kr
i
t−1 + λ
j
t−1,kr
j
t−1
,
where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. Setting Cijt−1,k :=
λit−1,kr
i
t−1
λit−1,kr
i
t−1+λ
j
t−1,kr
j
t−1
, we obtain
rit
[
1 + ρt
K∑
k=1
(
λjt,k − λit,k
)
Cijt−1,k
]
=
K∑
k=1
[
ρtλ
j
t,k + (1− ρt)Rt,k
]
Cijt−1,k.
Thus
rit
rjt
=
Aijt /B
ij
t
Ajit /B
ji
t
,
where
Aijt :=
K∑
k=1
[
ρtλ
j
t,k + (1− ρt+1)Rt,k
]
Cijt−1,k
,
Bijt := 1 + ρt
K∑
k=1
(
λjt,k − λit,k
)
Cijt−1,k.
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Observe that Bijt = B
ji
t . Indeed,
Bijt −Bjit = ρt
K∑
k=1
[(
λjt,k − λit,k
)
Cijt−1,k −
(
λit,k − λjt,k
)
Cjit−1,k
]
= ρt
K∑
k=1
(
λjt,k − λt, ki
)
= 0
because Cijt−1,k + C
ji
t−1,k = 1. Consequently,
r1t
r2t
=
A12t
A21t
=
r1t−1
r2t−1
∑K
k=1
[
ρtλ
2
t,k + (1− ρt)Rt,k
] λ1t−1,k
λ1t−1,kr
1
t−1/r
2
t−1+λ
2
t−1,k∑K
k=1
[
ρtλ1t,k + (1− ρt)Rt,k
] λ2t−1,k
λ1t−1,kr
1
t−1/r
2
t−1+λ
2
t−1,k
,
which yields (A.2).
A.3 Appendix
Let S be a finite set and for each s ∈ S, p (s) ≥ 0 be a probability distribution
on S. Let R (s) = (R1 (s) , . . . , RK (s)) be a vector in the simplex ∆
K satisfying
(5.11) and (A2). Let R˜k (s) := ρλ
∗
k + (1− ρ)Rk (s), where 0 < ρ < 1. Let % > 0
be a number, such that λ∗k > %. Denote by ∆
K
% the set of those vectors (b1, . . . , bK)
in ∆K that satisfy bk ≥ %, k = 1, . . . , K. Consider the function
Θ (s, κ, µ) = ln
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗k
λ∗kκ+ (1− κ)µk
− ln
K∑
k=1
R˜k (s)
µk
λ∗kκ+ (1− κ)µk
(A.3)
of s ∈ S, κ ∈ [0, 1] and µ = (µk) ∈ ∆K% .
Lemma A.2.
There exists a function δ% (γ) ≥ 0 of γ ∈ [0,∞) satisfying the following conditions:
1. The function δ (.) is non-decreasing, and δ% (γ) ≥ 0 for all γ > 0.
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2. For any κ ∈ [0, 1] and µ = (µk) ∈ ∆K% , we have
E [Θ (s, κ, µ)] ≥ δ% (|λ∗ − µ|) . (A.4)
Proof.
The proof of this lemma is based on the proofs of Lemma 3.1 of [21] and Lemma
1 of [2]. The only difference is that the second summand we have R˜k as defined
above and not Rk. But since
∑
s∈S p (s)Rk(s) =
∑
s∈S p (s) R˜k(s) = λ
∗
k. Moreover,
since Rk(s) satisfies (A2), R˜k(s) satisfies (A2) too. Let us take the expectation of
equation (A.3). Then from Lemma 3.1 of [21], for all s ∈ S, κ ∈ [0, 1] and any
µ ∈ ∆K% , µ 6= λ∗, the value of E [Θ (s, κ, µ)] is strictly positive.
E ln
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗k
λ∗kκ+ µk (1− κ)
− E ln
K∑
k=1
R˜k (s)
µk
λ∗kκ+ µk (1− κ)
≥ 0. (A.5)
Indeed, if µ = λ∗, inequality (A.5) turns into an equality. We now show that the
expression on the left-hand side of (A.5) - which is denoted by E [Θ (s, κ, µ)] - is
strictly positive for all κ ∈ [0, 1] and µ 6= λ∗. By applying Jensen’s inequality, we
find
E ln
K∑
k=1
Rk (s)
λ∗k
λ∗kκ+ µk (1− κ)
≥
K∑
k=1
λ∗k ln
λ∗k
λ∗kκ+ µk (1− κ)
, (A.6)
E ln
K∑
k=1
R˜k (s)
µk
λ∗kκ+ µk (1− κ)
≤ lnE
K∑
k=1
R˜k (s)
µk
λ∗kκ+ µk (1− κ)
(A.7)
and so
E [Θ (s, κ, µ)] ≥
K∑
k=1
ak ln
ak
akκ+ µk (1− κ) − ln
K∑
k=1
ak
µk
akκ+ µk (1− κ) , (A.8)
where ak = λ
∗
k.
Let κ = 0. Then the right-hand side of (A.8) reduces to
∑
ak ln ak −
∑
ak lnµk.
This difference is strictly positive, since (ak) 6= (µk).
If κ ∈ (0, 1], then we have a strict inequality in (A.7). To prove this it suffices to
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show that the function
φ (s) =
K∑
k=1
R˜k (s)µk [λ
∗
kκ+ (1− κ)µk]−1 , s ∈ S,
is not a constant. Suppose φ (s) is constant, i.e. φ (s) ≡ β. Then
K∑
k=1
R˜k (s)
(
µk [λ
∗
kκ+ (1− κ)µk]−1 − β
)
= 0, s ∈ S,
which implies µk = β (λ
∗
kκ+ (1− κ)µk), since the functions R˜k (.), k = 1, 2, . . . , K,
are linearly independent. We can see that β = 1, and so κ (λ∗k − µk) = 0. Since
κ > 0, this implies λ∗k = µk, k = 1, 2, . . . , K, which, however, is ruled out by our
assumptions.
It remains to prove that the expression on the right-hand side of (A.8) is non-
negative. It is equal to zero if κ = 1. If κ < 1, we can write it in the form
g (u) =
K∑
k=1
ak ln
ak
aku+ µk
− ln
K∑
k=1
ak
µk
aku+ µk
, (A.9)
where u = κ (1− κ)−1. We can see that g (u)→ 0 as u→∞. Thus it remains to
prove the inequality g
′
(u) ≤ 0 for all u > 0. We write
g
′
(u) = −
K∑
k=1
a2k (aku+ µk)
−1 +
∑K
k=1 a
2
kµk (aku+ µk)
−2∑K
k=1 akµk (aku+ µk)
−1 .
The sign of g
′
(u) is the same as the sign of the expression
J := −
[
K∑
k=1
a2k (aku+ µk)
−1
]
K∑
k=1
akµk (aku+ µk)
−1 +
K∑
k=1
a2kµk (aku+ µk)
−2 .
By setting wk = aku+ µk, we find µk = wk − aku and
J = −
[
K∑
k=1
a2kw
−1
k
]
K∑
k=1
ak (wk − aku)w−1k +
K∑
k=1
a2k (wk − aku)w−2k
= −
[
K∑
k=1
a2kw
−1
k
][
1−
K∑
k=1
a2kuω
−1
k
]
+
K∑
k=1
a2kw
−1
k −
K∑
k=1
a3kuw
−2
k
= u
( K∑
k=1
akνk
)2
−
K∑
k=1
akν
2
k
 ,
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where νk = akw
−1
k . The last expression is non-positive by virtue of the Schwartz
inequality.
By following Lemma 1 of [2], fix some γ0 > 0 for which the set W (s, γ) = {µ ∈
∆K% : |λ∗ − µ| ≥ γ} is non-empty for all s ∈ S, γ ∈ [0, γ0] and define
δ% (s, γ) = inf {E [Θ (s, κ, µ)] : κ ∈ [0, 1], µ ∈ W (s, γ)}
if γ ∈ [0, γ0] and δ% (s, γ) = δ% (s, γ0) if γ > γ0. Since E [Θ (s, κ, µ)] is continuous
and strictly positive on the compact set [0, 1] × W (s, γ) (γ > 0), the function
δ% (s, γ) takes on strictly positive values for γ > 0. Clearly this function is non-
decreasing in γ. Fix some s, consider any µ ∈ ∆K% and define γ = |λ∗ − µ|. Then
we have µ ∈ W (s, γ), and so
E [Θ (s, κ, µ)] ≥ δ% (s, γ) = δ% (s, |λ∗ − µ|) .
A.4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.18-(3).
We rewrite the function τ as
τ (r) =
∑K
k=1 δkfk (r)
1−∑Kk=1 βkf (r) ,
where δk := ρλk+(1− ρ)Rk, fk (r) := λkrλk(1−r)+λkr and βk := ρ
(
λk − λk
)
. We need
to show that
lim
h→0
[ ∑K
k=1 δkfk (a+ h)
1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a+ h) −
∑K
k=1 δkfk (a)
1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a)
]
1
h
(A.10)
exists. The limit of (A.10) is equivalent to
lim
h→0

∑K
k=1 δkfk (a+ h)
[
1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a)][
1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a+ h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a)]
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−
∑K
k=1 δkfk (a)
[
1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a+ h)][
1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a+ h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a)]
 1h
= lim
h→0

∑K
k=1 δk [fk (a+ h)− fk (a)] +
∑K
k=1 δkfk (a)
∑K
k=1 βkfk (a+ h)[
1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a+ h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a)]
−
∑K
k=1 δkfk (a+ h)
∑K
k=1 βkfk (a)[
1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a+ h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βkfk (a)]
 1h.
When we substitute the function fk in the above equation, we obtain
= lim
h→0

∑K
k=1
δkλkλkh
[λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)][λk(1−a)+λk(a)][
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
+
∑K
k=1 δk
λka
λk(1−a)+λka
∑K
k=1 βk
λk(a+h)
λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
−
∑K
k=1 δk
λk(a+h)
λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)
∑K
k=1 βk
λka
λk(1−a)+λka[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
 1h
= lim
h→0

∑K
k=1
δkλkλkh
[λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)][λk(1−a)+λk(a)][
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
+
∑K
k=1
∑K
k=1
δkλka
λk(1−a)+λka
βkλk(a+h)
λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
+
∑K
k,j=1
δkλka
λk(1−a)+λka
βjλj(a+h)
λj(1−a−h)+λj(a+h)[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
−
∑K
k=1
∑K
k=1
δkλka
λk(1−a)+λka
βkλk(a+h)
λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
−
∑K
k,j=1
δjλja
λj(1−a)+λja
βkλk(a+h)
λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
 1h
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= lim
h→0

∑K
k=1
δkλkλkh
[λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)][λk(1−a)+λk(a)][
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
+
∑K
k,j=1
[δkλkβjλja(a+h)][(λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h))(λj(1−a)+λja)]
(λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h))(λj(1−a)+λja)(λk(1−a)+λka)(λj(1−a−h)+λj(a+h))[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
−
∑K
k,j=1
[δkλkβjλja(a+h)][(λk(1−a)+λka)(λj(1−a−h)+λj(a+h))]
(λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h))(λj(1−a)+λja)(λk(1−a)+λka)(λj(1−a−h)+λj(a+h))[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
 1h
= lim
h→0

∑K
k=1
δkλkλkh
[λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)][λk(1−a)+λk(a)][
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
+
∑K
k,j=1
δkλkβjλja(a+h)h(λkλj−λkλj)
(λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h))(λj(1−a)+λja)(λk(1−a)+λka)(λj(1−a−h)+λj(a+h))[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
 1h
= lim
h→0

∑K
k=1
δkλkλk
[λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)][λk(1−a)+λk(a)][
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
+
∑K
k,j=1
δkλkβjλja(a+h)(λkλj−λkλj)
(λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h))(λj(1−a)+λja)(λk(1−a)+λka)(λj(1−a−h)+λj(a+h))[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λk(a+h)λk(1−a−h)+λk(a+h)] [1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]
 .
When we take the limit we obtain
τ
′
(a) =
∑K
k=1 δk
λkλk
[λk(1−a)+λka]
2 +
∑K
k=1 δk
λka
λk(1−a)+λka
∑K
k=1 βk
λkλk
[λk(1−a)+λka]
2[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]2
−
∑K
k=1 δk
λkλk
[λk(1−a)+λka]
2
∑K
k=1 βk
λka
λk(1−a)+λka[
1−∑Kk=1 βk λkaλk(1−a)+λka]2 .
The limit in (A.10) exists. Hence τ is differentiable.
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